

VICTORIAN COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT BANGLA DESH

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INTRODUCTION

Severe flooding, the worst cyclone of this century, the worst food deficit since the 1943 Bengal famine when three million people died, civil war - all this has happened to East Pakistan in less than a year. The result has been the effective expulsion of nine million citizens as refugees to India. There continues to be terrible suffering, both in the refugee camps in India and in East Pakistan.

The articles in this booklet have been brought together to relate and make known the horror of this civil war, the last of these disasters befalling the people of East Bengal. It has been the brutal assault of a modern army upon its defenceless internal colony. The documents collected here speak for themselves.

Since Thursday night, March 25, 1971, when the Pakistan Army opened its bloody account, the spirit of Bangla Desh (the Bengal nation) has been a reality. Since that night, groups have formed all over the world to support the cause of independent Bangla Desh. They welcome your interest and support. For further information write to:

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VICTORIAN COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT BANGLA DESH

There are now more than nine million Indians. The flow of people leaving their homes, at the rate of 250,000 a week, is going on, at the rate of 250,000 a week. Her own story of appalling atrocities that has been out on the Bengali population. Some are missing. Others have seen their friends and family members being raped. Many thousands of women have been raped.

The Army has burnt down entire villages. Correspondents estimate that hundreds could not escape have been killed. The reign of terror, to which is now added the world has never seen.

At the beginning of June, there were more than nine million. As the refugees may be nearly twenty million by India, one of the poorest countries of the world, all the cost of feeding them. She cannot

Even if Australia raises its aid dollars, which we could easily afford, it would not be enough. The situation, and to take what steps we can for safety.

The tragic story of the refugees, their, is the result of the refusal of Pakistan General Yahya Khan, to hand over power to the national elections held last December. The first national elections ever held in Pakistan (the Awami League) won 167 out of the 168 seats. An incredible demonstration of his support above all for what he stood for in Pakistan.

The two wings of Pakistan are a t India. Geographically, it is a ludicrous wings far away from each other, but they are ninety-eight per cent of the people in the West Muslims who left India when Pakistan was born. West speaks Bengali; no-one in the West of South-East Asia; West Pakistan is part of a culture that has little in common - except

The only reason why these two divisions that they were the two areas of British India were Muslims. When the British left the Muslim community, which was outnumbered partitioned the country into the Hindu majority areas, which were grouped to be

The Muslim leaders argued that there were two separate nations of people, and that to preserve their own "way of life", they refused to accept that the people of West had so little in common that they should be merged into one.

In 1947, these leaders took power in Pakistan, despite the fact that the majority was in the East. Ever since then, the nation has been in West Pakistan. All the headquarters of the government are in West Pakistan. So have the head forces, which have always eaten up at least

THE STORY OF THE REFUGEES

There are now more than nine million refugees from Bangla Desh in the flow of people leaving their homes to flee to safety is still at the rate of 250,000 a week. Each refugee arrives with his or her story of appalling atrocities that the Pakistan Army is carrying out in the Bengali population. Some arrive with hands, fingers, and feet missing. Others have seen their friends and family bayoneted to death. Thousands of women have been raped.

The Army has burnt down entire villages, and whole districts of correspondents estimate that hundreds of thousands of those who tried to escape have been killed. The refugees have left behind them a trail of terror, to which is now added the prospect of famine on a scale which has never been seen.

At the beginning of June, there were three million refugees, now there are more than nine million. As the famine spreads, the number of refugees may be nearly twenty million by the end of the year. So far, one of the poorest countries of the world, has had to bear almost the cost of feeding them. She cannot afford to feed them any more.

Even if Australia raises its aid to the refugees to ten million dollars, which we could easily afford, and if all the other rich countries did the same, it would not be enough. The refugees must go home. But they cannot go home while the Army remains to terrorize the Bengali population. It is to the refugees to understand what has caused this terrible situation, and to take what steps we can to allow them to return home in peace.

The tragic story of the refugees, and the dead they have left behind is the result of the refusal of Pakistan's military rulers, led by General Yahya Khan, to hand over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the winner of the national elections held last December. In these elections, the Awami League won 167 out of the 169 seats in East Pakistan. It was a credible demonstration of his support among the people, but it was not above all for what he stood for - "regional autonomy" for East Pakistan.

The two wings of Pakistan are a thousand miles apart, separated by a geographical barrier. Geographically, it is a ludicrous country. Not only are the two wings far away from each other, but they are inhabited by different peoples. Eighty-eight per cent of the people in the East are Bengalis, Baluchis, and others who left India when Pakistan was formed. In the East, almost everyone speaks Bengali; no-one in the West speaks it. East Pakistan is part of South-East Asia; West Pakistan is part of the Middle East. Their cultures have little in common - except Islam.

The only reason why these two distinct countries were made one is that they were the two areas of British India in which most of the population were Muslims. When the British left India in 1947, pressure from the Muslim community, which was outnumbered 3-to-1 by Hindus, forced them to partition the country into the Hindu majority area (India) and the Muslim majority areas, which were to become Pakistan.

The Muslim leaders argued that the Hindu and Muslim communities were two separate nations of people, and that Muslims must have a separate state to preserve their own "way of life", though there was really no such thing. They refused to accept that the people of the East and the people of the West had so little in common that they should form two Muslim states instead of one.

The leadership of the Muslim League, which was the ruling party from 1947 to 1958 (though no national elections were held) were almost West Pakistanis. So was the civil service, which really ran the country. Since 1958, Pakistan has been ruled by the Army, in which less than 10% are Bengalis, and the generals are all West Pakistanis.

Pakistan has been ruled by the West Pakistani minority since the beginning. The results have been disastrous for the Bengalis.

In 1950, the average income of a West Pakistan family was 10% higher than that of a Bengali family. By 1970, it was 100% higher.

Since Independence, West Pakistan, has taken two-thirds of the population live in desperate poverty in the East wing. It has taken 80% of the foreign aid donated by Australia and other countries.

West Pakistan has thus developed rapidly, while the East has remained comparatively stagnant. Because of the population increase, the Bengalis have as little now as they had twenty years ago. This is despite the fact that most of Pakistan's export earnings have been provided by the East, which produces great quantities of jute fibre and tea to be sold abroad. Most of the earnings from these sales have gone to buy imported goods for West Pakistan's industry.

Apart from this colonial-style exploitation, the West Pakistani leaders look down on Bengalis as an inferior race. They explain to themselves that West Pakistan is far less poor because West Pakistanis are superior people. Which they aren't.

Elections have been held only twice in East Pakistan (which is also known as East Bengal, and Bangla Desh). In 1954 the ruling Muslim League provincial government was opposed by a United Front of parties led by the Awami League. The United Front campaigned on a programme of "regional autonomy" by which the Central Government would have to turn over its right to collect revenue to the provincial government. This would mean that the Bengalis' money could no longer be used to finance development in West Pakistan. At the same time, the Front promised radical social and economic reforms to break down inequalities within the East.

The Front had a sweeping success. It won 223 out of 237 Muslim seats and was supported by almost all the Hindu parties. Two months later, the Government it formed was dismissed by the Central Government on the pretext of disorders in the province.

Self-government was not restored until the United Front had become disunited and the demand for autonomy was dropped. In 1958, the Army seized power, and no more direct elections were held until last December.

The Awami League platform last December was almost identical to that of the United Front in 1954. This time it won 167 out of 169 seats. They gave a clear majority in the 313-member National Assembly. It was supported by a number of minor parties from the backward regions of West Pakistan, giving it nearly a two-thirds majority in favour of regional autonomy.

It was strongly opposed, however, by the most important West Pakistani politician, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, by the Army, by the civil servants and the wealthy ruling classes of West Pakistan. In negotiations which lasted more than three months, the West Pakistani leaders failed to persuade Mujib to alter the programme on which he had been elected.

Rather than give up their privileged position, the West Pakistani Army stationed in the East launched a surprise midnight attack on March 25 aiming to destroy the Awami League's base of support, and to intimidate the Bengalis into submission.

The Bengali units of the Army led an uprising, in which the whole population joined. But the Army was too well-trained and too well-equipped. Since late April, a Bengali guerrilla resistance force has been challenging the Army throughout the countryside. And the war goes on. Our government wipes its hands, and supports the Pakistan Army. The land suffers the Army's onslaught. Refugees flee. And people die.

AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT
Dacca, East Pakistan

By an American citizen
at that time.

The attached report has been privately regional Office in Tokyo. The author in order not to jeopardize the position East Pakistan, and to protect the identity him information. He would like the information disseminated as widely as possible, and on its use.

Included in the text on page 14 is a map of the area, with a key to specific locations. The poems are reproduced which were written in the early March and which appeared in the

Having just been evacuated from blood to one of history's most massive examinations prepare this letter in the hope that purpose of: (1) informing my countrymen East Pakistan, which have been grossly examination of the justification for East Pakistan; and (2) inquiries into the economic and economic aid as regards the West that country. As regards the latter I mind that at 54% of Pakistan's population

The events leading up to the surprise Army of the West upon the unsuspecting and other centres of population in the 1971, may or may not have been reported. I will therefore summarize them briefly. subsequent events into proper context.

Ever since the partition of India in Pakistan with 4,000 miles of India. East has complained that the West, with capital and control of the Army, treated was at the basis of the abortive uprising crushed by the military. It was also of General Yahya Khan as President of Law Government in 1969.

The first nation-wide general election the history of this troubled young nation 1970. Seats in the National Assembly equivalent blocks of population. The it represented 46% of the population, won a sweeping victory, winning all but province (Bengal). In the West some various numbers of seats, with the PPP emerging as the major party in the West. leader of the PPP, while Sheikh Mujib Awami League.

I believe it was in December when the main points of differences before the Constitutional Assembly scheduled for but the PPP representatives terminated the major agreements. The Awami League firmly for its six points, two of which namely, (1) a large degree of autonomy federated central government; and (2) with India.

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AN EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN
DACC A, EAST PAKIS TAN, IN MARCH AND APRIL, 1974.

By an American citizen living in Dacca at
that time.

The attached report has been privately distributed via the WSOFI-
sonal Office in Tokyo. The author has asked to remain anonymous
in order not to jeopardize the possibility of his returning to
Pakistan, and to protect the identity of people who provided
information. He would like the information he has recorded
circulated as widely as possible, and there are no restrictions
on its use.

Included in the text on page 14 is a map of the Dacca University
area, with a key to specific locations on page 15. On page 16 two
pages are reproduced which were written following the shootings in
early March and which appeared in the local press.

April 8, 1974.

Having just been evacuated from bloody Dacca where I was a witness
to one of history's most massive examples of genocide, I hasten to
prepare this letter in the hope that it will help serve the triple
purpose of: (1) informing my countrymen of the recent events in
West Pakistan, which have been grossly misrepresented; (2) re-
examination of the justification for all forms of U.S. aid to
Pakistan; and (3) inquiries into the allocation and use of U.S. milita-
ry and economic aid as regards the West wing and the East wing of
that country. As regards the latter point, it should be borne in
mind that at 54% of Pakistan's population lives in East Pakistan.

The events leading up to the surprise attack by the largely Punjabi
Army of the West upon the unsuspecting residents of Dacca, Chittagong,
and other centres of population in the East on the night of 25th March
1974, may or may not have been reported in the American news media.
I will therefore summarize them briefly in the interest of putting
subsequent events into proper context.

Ever since the partition of India in 1947, which created two
Pakistan with 4,000 miles of India in between, the more populous
East has complained that the West, which included the national
capital and control of the Army, treated it as a colony. This issue
was at the basis of the abortive uprising in Dacca in 1969 which was
crushed by the military. It was also a large factor in the appointment
of General Yahya Khan as President and Administrator of Martial
Law Government in 1969.

The first nation-wide General elections on a one, one-vote basis in
the history of this troubled young nation were held on December 7
1970. Seats in the National Assembly were to represent generally
equivalent blocks of population. The West would have fewer seats
it represented 46% of the population. In the East, the Awami League
won a sweeping victory, winning all but two of the seats allotted to the
province (Bangal). In the West some half dozen or more parties won
various numbers of seats, with the Peoples' Party of Pakistan (PPP)
emerging as the major party in the West. Z. A. Bhutto was the
leader of the PPP, while Sheikh Mujib Rahman was the leader of the
Awami League.
I believe it was in December when Yahya Khan called upon the politi-

time between mid-January and early February the western wing announced that they would boycott the Constitutional Assembly. It is reported that the minor parties had been intimidated by the PPP into agreeing to the boycott. The truth of this has borne out by the fact that the boycott was repudiated by those successful candidates were already in Dacca on March 1. It is also reported that some of the PPP electees to the National Assembly had decided to ignore the party boycott.

On March 4, Yahya Khan announced the postponements of the Constitutional Assembly.

On March 2, there were many processions in protest against the postponement of the Constitutional Assembly, involving many thousands of men and boys. The army suddenly came out of the cantonment in the afternoon and attacked the processions with machine-guns and snipers. The casualties were reported officially as 100, but it is likely as several thousands, mostly dead. The real number is never known as the army was reported by eye witnesses to have taken the bodies to the cantonment.

The press reported the hospitals overflowing with wounded. All were treated desperately short of blood. A general appeal was made for blood. This was in grim contrast to the situation three weeks later when a major onslaught began. In the wake of the later attack the people there were no wounded except in rare cases. Only a few sick and the dead marked the trail of the brutal army. Neither my colleagues knew of more than one case in Dacca that reached hospital. This was a student at Jagannath Hall, the only survivor. He had been left for dead among the bodies of a group of fellow students trapped on the rooftop of Jagannath Hall.

Following the attacks upon peaceful demonstrations, Sheikh Mujib Rahman led a three day hartal (General strike) to be effective in Dacca on March 3 and throughout the Bengal province March 4 and 5 exempting hospitals and electric power workers. The army went back to barracks in Dacca and the hartal was observed with 100% compliance in mounting for the ever-growing list of martyrs. (See attached list). In other parts of Bengal Dakh there were confrontations with the army during the hartal and hundreds of additional people were killed.

After the hartal, the Awami League ordered all schools, universities, government offices throughout the province to be boycotted until further notice. Factories were ordered to resume production. Again there was 100% compliance. A new martial law was issued requiring all civil servants concerned with defense to return to their post or face trial by court martial. The Awami League told the civil servants to ignore it. All complied.

There were occasional incidents of violence between Bengalis and non-Bengalis during the afternoon and night of March 2 when normal police protection was interrupted by confrontation with the military. These were isolated incidents and may have been the acts of hoodlums. No further incidents occurred in Dacca after the Awami League took control of the province on March 3rd. In this connection, Sheikh Mujib called upon every Bengali to regard the protection of the lives and properties of non-Bengalis as his "sacred trust".

The period between March 3 and March 25 was the period of "non-violent non-co-operation movement". Foreign residents in Dacca repeatedly expressed amazement at the tremendous degree of self-discipline, enthusiasm, and orderliness with which the multitudes of the city conducted themselves. I have never seen anything like it. Every day thousands of people marched in various processions organized by firms, schools or societies.

are known for their tendency to be somewhat volatile. However this as one of their characteristics. On the contrary, they have their steadfastness of purpose. They have not hesitated to go throughout Bangia Dash with their dead bodies as a testimony of their brutality. It is true that the Bengalis is emotional. He is the world's most warm, outgoing, and successful individuals.

foreign to his nature, but you don't find anyone who will more so, his life for his people. I earnestly wanted to see them set up a government. It could have been a model.

great significance was that during the brief but joyous period of the "Dash" was the common greeting, prices in the markets actually went down. This indicated general confidence in Awami League leadership. Merchants at all levels agreed and made a public announcement to continue to get their supplies at reasonable prices. A major reason for the somewhat lower food prices was the Awami League's decision for the government to stop paying a 10% tax to the Central Government as a result of the use of military hardware against the Bengalis.

During this period the streets were patrolled at night by Awami League units to prevent acts of lawlessness. In this they had the active support of the thousands of university students and faculty members.

At this time there was a time of contagious goodwill, there were ominous signs of a general upsurge which caused me to write to a friend in mid-March, "Either the Bengalis are about to be realized or we are about to be realized. God bless." The signs were these:

1. After the elections a division or more of Bengal Rifles in East Bengal were relieved of all heavy armament.

2. The confrontation of March 2, Admiral Anson, Deputy Martial Law Administrator in East Pakistan was replaced on March 3 (or about) by Admiral Tikka Khan, well known for his brutality in crushing civil liberties.

3. General Government (Martial Law Government) was "unable to guarantee the safety" of foreign nationals. This led to the early evacuation of British and Japanese, except consular staffs, and British women and children followed by dependents of U.N.D.P. experts on March 9. These actions caused the Bengalis grave concern and apprehension since they felt the foreigners had no reason to fear them. The local people drew much comfort from the fact that the Americans announced "no plans for leaving". The French and the Russians also remained.

4. Sudden and uncharacteristic return of the West Pakistan Army to barracks in all East Pakistan took its orders from the Awami League and ignored military régime.

5. Cancellation of all civilian flights by the Pakistan International Airlines between the two wings of the country and the intensive use of their Boeing-made Boeing 707's as troop transports. Their US Aid C.130's were also used before and during this period in the intensive military operations. Most of the incoming troops were from the Punjab. Seats on scheduled flights were reserved exclusively for dependents of West Pakistan military and business personnel previously stationed in the East wing.

6. The military and arms ship "Swat" had sailed from Karachi for Chittagong.

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that are related from here on are an account of what I saw, heard, and felt on the night of March 25-26 until I was evacuated on the afternoon of March 26. Unless otherwise stated, the situations and events described are by myself.

Dacca in Blood and Flames

An Eye Witness Account

M. I came into my room from the roof during a lull in the shooting on the night of March 25-26 until I was evacuated on the afternoon of March 26. Unless otherwise stated, the situations and events described are by myself.

After midnight I was awakened by a sudden outburst of rifle and machine gun fire. From the roof, where I spent the rest of the night and the next day, I saw that the sound of firing was coming from five main points: the East Dacca, Dacca University, the cantonment of the East Pakistan Rifles, the cantonment of the East Pakistan Rifles, and the cantonment of the East Pakistan Rifles. All were under simultaneous attack. A modern army against an unwarmed people! Sounds of fighting soon came from the direction of the cantonment of the East Pakistan Rifles.

Central police station and living quarters. This was heavy as were the buildings from the East Pakistan Rifles Cantonment. Apparently the East Pakistan Rifles were putting up a fight. Soon the sky was lit up with the flashes of Old Dacca, the New Market and various other places. At times flames could be seen high over the tops of buildings.

At 3.00 A.M. the clattering sound of rubber cleats on the pavement told me that the East Pakistan Rifles were putting up a fight. Soon the sky was lit up with the flashes of Old Dacca, the New Market and various other places. At times flames could be seen high over the tops of buildings.

It appeared that all four had been moved into the attack. The frequent reports of heavy tanks into the areas of the East Pakistan Rifles and the cantonment of the East Pakistan Rifles. The tanks added to the inequality of the struggle.

An American friend went down on to the street to see what was going on. He had apparently just changed to army hands and my friend told me that he had been shot. Apparently the only thing that saved him was his position to the inequality of the struggle.

At 4.00 A.M. the sky was aglow in all directions but the bigger fires were still burning in the city.

At 4.30 just before daylight, army amplifiers could be heard calling for the students to surrender, or at least I assumed the order to have been given. The students because of the direction. The mobile amplifiers were to stay inside their houses or be shot. A significant fact dawned on me. The lulls in the shooting must have been ordered so as to allow the shooting. When the amplified orders were finished the shooting resumed. With the streets full of soldiers and motor patrols, how could they get out in this man hunt get home alive now that it was daylight?

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nt, still March 26, was a repetition of the last. Some elements of the Indian Rifles were still holding out but were destroyed that night. There were other pockets of resistance. The fire from the tanks. There were other pockets of resistance. A British night.

from Journal:

can reported 100 dead in the shooting of last night and today. Reported March 2. Having heard the shooting in both massacres, present onslaught is a thousandfold more intense and widespread lasted much longer. Radio reported "Situation under control" "normal".

addressed the nation by radio this p.m. at 8:00 o'clock. He referred to Tikka Khan on grounds that the Awami League was secessionist. Sheikh Mujib Rahman was a criminal and would be punished as such. That under Awami League illegal rule arson, looting, and murder were the day. All foreigners living in Dacca and observing events knew these allegations were true. On the contrary, Mujib held out threats to declare the independence of Bangla Desh (Bengal) to the time the Army attacked. This was, in my opinion, a weakness. During the first week of March, he might have pulled it off. Military build up made it impossible. I wonder if ever before a general election has been outlawed by a military government. Khan, outlawed the Awami League and made continued membership a court martial.

day - from my Journal

can friend and I took a walk this morning after curfew lifted at night. I visited the New Market, now in smoking ruins. Hundreds of lives with their goods had been killed on their mats beds during the attack Thursday night. Most had died without even leaving their shops. Others were cut down while trying to escape. Most of the bodies were away by the army yesterday, but many were still in their shops to smell. I talked to a surviving proprietor whom I knew. He said the soldiers had looted the shops after the indiscriminate killings.

tragic difference in the faces of these people! Two days ago they were radiant, and full of hope. Today they are gaunt and fearful and shamed at what has been done to them. The streets in all directions are filled with the debris of barricades - sewer pipes, felled trees, trucks and buses, heaps of bricks and paving stones. Openings are cleared in most obstructions. Everywhere one sees pathetic little figures with terror-stricken faces walking out of the city carrying cooking pots or other humble possessions that could be carried on the hands. Among the younger women there was the invariable load on their hips - an infant or toddler too small to keep up. Even little children carried something, such as a kerosene lantern, a pot, or a cotton bag. Younger men and teen age boys were conspicuously absent. Lying behind knowing they would be prime targets for the Army. The mass exodus of Dacca's poorest residents. Their tiny huts of mud and that make continuous lines along smelly canals, railroad rights of way and along little colonies had been systematically fire bombed during the previous nights. Throughout the night and pre-dawn hours they had been cut down by machine guns as they fled their burning homes. The horror on their faces was mute proof of what the survivors had seen. These people had no destination - just to get out of Dacca.

friend and I proceeded toward the campus of Dacca University. On the way attention was called to a University quadrangle (See chart). We entered the quadrangle at the sight of a lot of dead bodies - all bare-footed little children only in tunics (skirts) - all bearded, seemingly of beggar or at

Like crying as we viewed the ruins of Rokaya Hall--
 when the University closed on March 2, the day the
 people, most of the girls went home, some who
 at places, however, and women student leaders continued to
 Our student companions had told us that 40-50
 ing in Rokaya on the night of the attack, they
 bombed with napalm. As the girls left the inferno
 down by machine guns and their bodies trucked to the
 here were conflicting reports. A faculty source
 part of the girls were killed. The others were tak-
 cantonment and have not been seen since.

moon of March 28 (Sunday) I made a discreet visit
 ends. I had already been given the names of a number
 sed professors and department heads who had been taken
 es and shot during the previous day, and several of
 firm that there had indeed been such a diabolical
 e leading brains of the institution. Already some
 and department heads had been executed during
 my list and added other names. They implore me to
 ation to the outside world. They agreed to g
 es many of the 32 as was possible. Rendezvous were
 fferent places, and at of course, different times,
 wing afternoon. I urged them to avoid placing them-
 et danger. None of the three kept his rendezvous. ALL
 reliable. I feared the worst. At the beginning of
 urfew, Sunday March-28, at 5pm. the army began a system
 of homes for students. They were rounded up and taken to
 t. No-one on the outside knows what happened to them.
 hope is that my contacts among the hundreds of
 o were leaving delly for the border for training.
 -list, although incomplete, is presented at the end of
 with such annotations as are possible. It is largely
 the most distinguished men at the University. Some were
 ost distinguished of the entire sub-continent. Approx-
 are given in parentheses.

ed to mention in proper sequence the long list of harsh
 ive Kartial Law Orders issued over the radio at midday
 they included: illegal assembly-more than 5 persons; the
 if specified times and places, of all firearms, and all
 machines of all descriptions; (the latter applying to
 nks as well as individuals and organizations) the right
 to enter and search buildings, without a warrant, as long
 re at least three accompanied by at least an officer of
 s prohibition of carrying or possessing any object that
 ed as a peircing weapon; prohibition of any spoken or
 d or any sign that could interfere with the operation of
 All civil servants were ordered back to work as of
 nday March 29. There were others- 17 in all. To violate
 d result in trial by court martial. The first of the new
 orders were issued at dawn, March 26, over amplifiers
 the city. "Anyone saying "Joy Bangla" will be shot."

al Law Orders were in sharp contrast with the tranquillity
 imposed discipline under which the people of Bangla Desh
 themselves during the three week rule of the Awami League.
 ever seen such proof of ability of self-government.

stations and their living quarters were hit with practical
 type of military hardware during the first part of the first
 the massacre. Two reliable sources reported a grim scene
 (King's Garden), Special Police barracks on the morning
 e complex of 4-6 storey concrete apartment buildings had
 ed with liquid fire and napalm.

staggering but unknown number of police and their wives and children fell victim to the flame-throwing tanks, rockets, and machine guns. This happened in more or less similar circumstances at several police stations throughout the city. Other reports indicated a concerted rounding up and shooting of police who had escaped the initial attack. The number of police killed has been variously estimated between 4,000 and 10,000, but no one has precise figures. One thing is consistent... People who were out and around in the between March 27 and April 4 concur that the Dacca Police force has been effectively wiped out.

I tried to check out reports of two other massacres, both involving in their places of worship, but was only partially successful. One was fairly well confirmed report that Father Paul Gomez (R.C.) at St. Gregory's Church and school in Old Dacca had been killed along with some 800+ - with Hindu converts who had sought sanctuary on the parish grounds. The army cordoned off the area and it was impossible to get close enough to observe the church or the school. I did however see an appalling amount of destruction particularly of small industries utilizing metal and wood, and food shops, including the principal meat and fish market in the Old City. There were signs that the army was trying to shift the blame to Bengali residents. I doubt if any foreigner would buy that who had heard the heavy concentration firing in the Old City during the first and second nights of the attack. Furthermore, the Bengalis look upon the Hindus of India as their only hope for freedom from West Pakistan. Regardless of what has happened in the past, they are quite unlikely to risk losing their only friend in this crisis.

Another major atrocity that I had heard about was the army attack upon ancient Hindu temples in the center of the race track (Chart 31) near to Intercontinental Hotel. I found them in ruins, unburned. The old walls had been breached, apparently the work of a tank. I saw what had been described to me by a reliable eye witness as being a pit filled with bodies. It had been covered in the meantime with earth and brush but there were definitely bodies beneath. Hungry dogs had uncovered some arms and legs - sickening sight. I have no idea as to the depth of the pit nor the number of bodies. The estimate of the above-mentioned eye witness was several hundred.

I didn't carry at either area. I had seen that the army was rounding up suspects during the off curfew hours. Previous to Monday this had been done during curfew. I had seen several young men passing by sitting on the floor of army jeeps under heavy guard, usually 3 riflemen and an officer with a drawn sword. This was to become a familiar scene in the days ahead. The brave but hopeless faces of the young men on their way to the detention to face what? Probably torture, questioning and death.

In the afternoon, on my way to start keeping rendezvous with my contacts who failed to show, I came upon a collection point for duplicating machinery near the Intercontinental. There were long lines of automobiles, rickshaws and pedestrians bearing all manner of machines from simple dittos to high speed automatic equipment.

On the previous day, on my way to church, I had come upon much longer lines of men and boys giving up their firearms at a similar collection point. I didn't see any high power rifles, although there may have been some. They were mostly shotguns and low calibre target rifles - a poor match for a modern army. I thought and it was just as well that they were giving them up.

March 29 (continued)

I visited the U.S. Consulate - a daily occurrence - and learned of the decision to evacuate us as soon as possible. At the Consulate I talked to some of the two Americans who with four Britishers were caught taking pictures from an automobile by an army patrol. I suppose this story has hit the American press, so I won't go into the details except to say that they were lined up and shot. For some reason the order was reversed. The Americans were freed, but

which were taken away. The Consular General...
The rest of this report has to do with matters of
journal entries over a period of days and are the
treated comprehensively rather than as dated epis-

Elim of Terror

In his address to the nation on the evening of March 27, 1971, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, was stating that the Awami League had taken control of the West Pakistan. This was not true. The very opposite was the case. The Awami League took control of the West Pakistan. The Awami League does exist now, however. It began on the night of March 27, 1971, when the West Pakistan Army of the West launched its surprise attack on the Awami League. It almost totally unarmed residents of Dacca and Chittagong.

I have already written of the Indian...
with male and female. It is my unpleasant duty to reveal a list of incidents.

By cross checking with other refugees during and after the mass killing at St. Gregory's was only a partial confirmation of the mass killing. The whole area of a largely Hindu community and its inhabitants machine gunned in the streets. The fact of the fact that the army had cordoned off the area was previously reported, the sky aglow over the Old City. The smoke-created light over the whole city throughout the night. It also reported earlier in this writing that I heard of shooting and bombing in that area. I therefore have a list of reports of some of my fellow evacuees of the mass killing of Hindus occurred.

The destruction of many small industries seen by me, and the elimination of the Hindu community in the Old City for the unrestrained Punjab soldiers, all 4 (Sunday) while we were waiting for the long overcast us, all remaining men and boys residing in a building on the Old City Road as it enters Old Dacca were rounded up by an eye witness of unquestioned reliability who was

I have already mentioned the exodus of terror-stricken to the countryside. I was informed by a number of the refugees had no fixed destination. Their only hope was to get to safety and shelter outside the city. On April 2 and 3 what was happening to them. I have become a mere trickle. Apparently word had gotten around. They were being...
particularly at concentration points, i.e. at...
dozens of Indian...
among which were the following:

About a hundred refugees had boarded a river...
Sailors came aboard and shot them all including...
Europeans who rented a boat to rescue a European...
reported large numbers of bodies floating on the

The proprietor of a local firm with whom I had had...
that on a trip for supplies on the road to Chittagong...
of a family group - fifteen in all who had just...
it was an old man who had been pushing a two-wheeled...
household goods. His body was lying on the cart...
the roadside. Broken goods were scattered

Children
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This report has to do with matters that involved
over a period of days and are therefore
extensively rather than as cited episodes.

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to the nation on the evening of March 26, Yajna Khan in
following of the Awami League said that it had created a reign
was not true. The very opposite situation existed from the
and League took control of East Pakistan on March 3. A reign
last now, however. It began on the night of March 25 when the
the West launched its surprise attack upon the unsuspecting
warned residents of Dacca and Chittagong.

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ready written of the indignation and killing of people of all ages
male. It is my unpleasant duty to recollect and add to the
accidents.

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Checking with other refugees during and after evacuation I learned
telling at St. Gregory's was only a part of the fate of Hindus
The whole areas of a largely Hindu community was cordoned off and
inhabitants machine gunned in the streets. Although only a
fact that the army had cordoned off the area. I did see, as
reported, the sky aglow over the Old City for two nights, and saw
ed light over the whole city throughout Friday, March 26. I
ped earlier in this writing that I heard a heavy concentration
bombing in that area. I therefore have no doubt as to the
reports of some of my fellow evacuees that a systematic
massacres occurred.

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destruction of many small industries steadily in ruins as already
the elimination of the Hindu community was not enough tragedy
for the unrestrained Punjab soldiers. On the afternoon of
(?) while we were waiting for the jets overdue PIA plane to
all remaining men and boys residing in a certain street off
as it enters Old Dacca were rounded up and shot. This came to
cases of unquestioned reliability who was evacuated later.

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ready mentioned the exodus of terror-stricken residents from
countryside. I was informed by a number of local people that
refugees had no fixed destination. Their homes had been burned and
ing for safety and shelter outside the city. I didn't know
and what was happening to them. I had noticed that the exodus
were true. Apparently word had gotten back as to what was
they were being organized at various points, along highways and
at concentration points, i.e. at various river crossings and
down into the streams. Dozens of incidents were reported to
were the following:

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hundred refugees had boarded a river launch on the Buriganga
bers came aboard and shot them all including the crew.
men who rented a boat to rescue a European stranded south of the
had large numbers of bodies floating on the Buriganga.

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proprietor of a local firm with whom I had had business dealings told
trip for supplies on the road to Chittagong, he came upon the
family group - fifteen in all who had just been killed. The only
was an old man who had been pushing a two wheeled cart loaded with
old goods. His body was lying on the cart. The women and children
the roadside. Broken goods were scattered all about.

Part of the reign of terror has involved the violation of women by soldiers. Well substantiated incidents are far too numerous to report individually. They seem to follow a pattern, typical of which the wife of a daughter of an important Bengali is taken to the cantonment and is not returned again. An exception that came to my attention occurred on my street during curfew and repeatedly violated throughout the night and returned her family in most pitiable condition the following morning. I knew a number of Americans and Europeans whose homes were used as shelters for terrified girls and women.

Aside from the students and faculty of Dacca University whose plight has already been described, the next hardest hit group is that composing the successful candidates and all levels of leadership of the outlawed league. As of April 3 they were being hunted down and shot not just the but their families and anyone who tried to shelter them as well. This was going on in Dacca and such nearby villages as the army controlled. My information came from a very high source.

The same source told me of an established trend. In the upper level civil service, as East Pakistanis die or retire, their places tend to be filled by West Pakistanis. He predicted that the same would occur after for lower levels of civil service. This has been going on, he said, since shortly after the Awami League won the first general election in November and December. (The vote was postponed in the areas affected by the tidal bore and cyclone.)

Tied to and a part of the reign of terror has been the systematic destruction of the city's food supply. From the first night of attack, markets have been a prime target. Napalm bombs have incinerated them all. The last to be destroyed within the city was the Sarinagar Market on the night of March 31. In the early morning of April 1 (6.10 a.m.) Zifta Bazar, the big wholesale market across the Buriganga River was shelled with napalm. This market had supplied rice, wheat flour, pulses, spices, etc. to a considerable number of retail markets within the city.

The food situation was becoming progressively more acute from April 1 until we evacuated on the 4th. Spiraling prices removed the poor and very poor from competition for the dwindling supplies. Many civil servants were also affected as their cheques had not come over from the west for their February and March salaries.

It had become apparent by April 4 that another systematic level of destruction was aimed at non-agricultural industries. I have already mentioned having seen the ruins of small industries utilizing metal and wood in the City. Not seen by me, but very well substantiated, are reports that the industrial town of Tongi, 20 miles north of Dacca, lies in ruins. This was the heart of a large textile industry. Other industrial plants were looted there. "Only the BATA shoe factory and the Pakistan Telephone Industries escaped destruction or serious damage." This would mean that factories destroyed or seriously damaged included an important machine tool plant, various chemical plants, and a small ordinance factory, the only one of its kind in East Pakistan.

I have not heard what has happened to industries located in other parts where the West Pakistan forces are in control.

In spite of all the destruction and shooting that was still going on up to the time of our evacuation, the censored radio, TV and two Dacca newspapers (now single sheets) proclaimed "all is rapidly returning to normal" - "all normal" - "shops throughout the city are open..." Most shops which had seen destruction had been padlocked at closing time on March 25 and were still padlocked on evacuation day. Yet the media reported "Shops throughout the city had a busy day." "All government offices are open and working as usual."

placed civil servant said to me on April 3, "We have heard that you would be too conspicuous. But how can a man work who has been removed?" There were only five men in that office when I left, twenty or more.

The irony of the "everything is back to normal in Dacca" was that on April 3, the day before the first plane I had been evacuated. I had completed a business appointment in the Central Area and was walking toward Adamjee Court which was to be my office. It was about 10.30 a.m. All of a sudden, there was a fire for several blocks along the next street parallel to my office. The fire was very thick and I saw people running for their lives. The nearest unblocked public buildings or stores. By the time I got to the street, the fire was so thick that I could not see. I saw people running for their lives. The nearest unblocked public buildings or stores. By the time I got to the street, the fire was so thick that I could not see. I saw people running for their lives.

I heard a lot of shooting going on in the Dharmondia area in Dacca, yet all was "normal" according to the censors. When we got to Karachi we found that the press was being told to report facts as regards events in the East. We were being fed blatant untruths.

I have limited this report to the capital city of East Pakistan, partly because of the impossibility to check on other places and partly in the interest of doing as much as possible in Dacca. This general comment is factual and is based on League controls the villages with the exceptions all over the East of the towns and secondary cities. The flag of Bangladesh on all river boats and at river ports as of April 10.

The largest concentration of West Pakistan forces was in the figure most often reported is 60,000. The number at the time is believed to have been around 10,000 at the time of the attack. I am sure that the forces for further mischief in the East were being held in reserve. I am sure that the forces for further mischief in the East were being held in reserve. I am sure that the forces for further mischief in the East were being held in reserve.

As regards Chittagong, the second city and only major port on the coast, I have not had time to check on it. I am sure that the forces for further mischief in the East were being held in reserve. I am sure that the forces for further mischief in the East were being held in reserve.

The monsoons are due to begin at the end of April. It is only interested in the more literate East (74% of the population are illiterate) as an agricultural colony, producing enough to feed itself and to export to the West. It is only interested in the more literate East (74% of the population are illiterate) as an agricultural colony, producing enough to feed itself and to export to the West.

The universal thought among the Bengalis of my acquaintance is only interested in the more literate East (74% of the population are illiterate) as an agricultural colony, producing enough to feed itself and to export to the West. It is only interested in the more literate East (74% of the population are illiterate) as an agricultural colony, producing enough to feed itself and to export to the West.

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servant said to me on April 3, "We have to appear. Our
conspicuous. But how can a man work when his heart has
there were only five men in that office where before I had

everything is back to normal in Dacca" announcements
April 3, the day before the first plane load of Americans
completed a business appointment in the Northjeel

was walking toward Adamjee Court which houses the U.S.
about 10.30 a.m. All of a sudden, there was an outburst of
rival blocks along the next street parallel to the one I was
now thoroughly conditioned Bengalis. On my street fled
checked public buildings or stores. By the time I reached
thing had stopped on my left, but had broken out less
right.

of shooting going on in the Dharmendi area during my last
night. It was "normal" according to the censored media.

in Karachi. We found that the press was, as one would expect,
facts as regards events in the East. Worse than that, the
had blatant untruths.

this report to the capital city of East Pakistan and its
because of the impossibility to check on reports that came in
and partly in the interest of doing as complete a report as
possible. This general comment is factual and significant: The
villages with the exceptions already noted, as well
as secondary cities. The flag of Bangla Desh was still
on boats and at river ports as of April 3.

concentration of West Pakistan forces was garrisoned at Dacca.
then reported is 60,000. The number at Chittagong, the second
to have been around 10,000 at the time of attack, Dacca was
releasing forces for further mischief in secondary cities -
Kulna, Rajshahi - to mention those presently under attack.
and report of interest regarding the latter city and
sent dedication to freedom was the overwhelming of some 300
leaders by human wave tactics. The Rajshahi University students
without weapons except stick and stones kept coming on faster
rifles and automatic rifles could mow them down. Many soldiers
the rest retreated to their campment.

Chittagong, the second city and only major seaport in Bangla
to say that it is now a dead city. I have talked to a number of
there during the fighting. A regiment of East Pakistan Rifles
leading officers, and put up a terrific fight for several days
heavily overwhelmed by more numerous and heavier armed forces.
killed from a battleship in the harbor and bombed by American
the vitai railroad between Chittagong and the interior has been
cess for a long time to come. The rails and sleepers were taken
of points to build road blocks, according to reliable reports.

are due to begin at the end of April. The Bengalis are
they come earlier this year and bog down the West Pakistan army.
the army is conscious of its tenuous hold on the East and is
to break the back of the resistance and seal off the Indian border
regions.

deal thought among the Bengalis of my acquaintance is that the
interested in the more literate East (24% as compared to 18% in

Therefore assumed that the report that Yahya Khan has ordered steps to live off the land is true. In fact, it could not be

it should be remembered that the unpre-
 natural disaster on November II, 1970, destroyed over one
 the Aman paddy crop in the most intensive production area of
 2,500 square miles. The cyclone and tidal
 claimed the lives of many hundreds of thousands of people-
 a million or more. This is harvest time for Boro paddy
 chaotic conditions being caused by the reign of terror in
 quite apt to interfere with the harvest and severed roads
 function of market places will surely impede the marketing of
 of the crop as is harvested. More serious, however, is the
 this is also planting time for the major paddy crop-Aman-
 est time for which is November and December. It was already
 ed unlikely that more than 500,000 acres of the 1,000,000
 the affected area would be planted this year because of shortages
 and tillage equipment. Now civil war is most certain to reduce
 and area even further- perhaps very much further.
 is not the affected coastal area alone that spells famine in the
 need, throughout East Pakistan this is the time to be getting in
 Aman crop. But this requires the movement and purchase of
 er and seed. No-one knows the extent to which the fertilizer
 ration system has been disrupted, but with civil war in all major
 ion centres, the disruption is surely very considerable. Then there is
 matter of credit. Few farmers have the cash reserve to
 all the seed and fertilizer that they require. There is every
 to believe that the two major sources of institutional credit; the
 istan Agricultural Development Bank and the Cooperative Directorate
 ctionally paralyzed. This all adds up to a sharp drop in rice
 on in 1971.

Why not make up the difference in imports? according to an
 ment by Allan Macdonald, Director of the British Philanthropic
 ation, The War Against Want, who forecasts famine for Bangla Desh,
 food grain imports are 10% of annual consumption. He concluded in
 port for the Famine Emergency Committee following the cyclone and
 ore that imports in 1971 would rise to 20%. The situation has
 ally no seed because of the civil war. The need for supplementary
 will greatly exceed 20% as a result of existing disruptions and
 is not in sight.

Even if the Central Martial Law Government were disposed to fill
 by using scarce foreign exchange to purchase good grain for the
 a highly unlikely possibility in view of the wholesale destruction
 and life which it is presently inflicting by military means- there would
 extremely difficult if not insurmountable problem of distribution
 the port city, railroads, and highways knocked out.

We were happily surprised at not being searched upon evacuation
 in Dacca or Karachi. In view of the three thorough searches of the
 foreign correspondents who were bottled up at the Purbani Hotel on
 night of March 25 and physically removed from the country on March 26,
 view of the three hour search of the British group on April 2, we
 expected to be searched. In anticipation of a body search, the list
 cated university professors and department heads was put in a tiny
 and shut away from the outside world by a nervous sphincter muscle.
 I have been employed by a number of Bengalis, including a high
 ment official, to make these facts known to the outside world.

KEY TO CHART

- Filled petrol station
- Dead bodies
- Police station
- Entrance to Dacca University
- Staff housing
- Social Hall
- Site of dead students
- Army trucks entered here
- M. Hall
- West exit lane - West
- East exit lane - East
- Jagannath Hall
- Sakya Hall
- Vice Chancellor's residence
- British Council
- Home Economics College and girls' hostel
- Men Girls College and hostel
- Shaheed Mirar
- Teacher-Student Centre
- Public Library
- New Arts Faculty Building
- Staff housing where professors and department heads were taken out and shot
- Staff housing
- Atomic Energy Centre
- Bengali Academy
- Curzon Hall (Science Faculty) compound
- Medical College and Hospital
- Engineering University
- and 27B. Engineering University and Medical College Hostel complex
- New Market - burned out
- Barracks of Bengali refugees from West Pakistan*
- High Court compound
- Hindu temples in centre of race course

*Formerly East Pakistan jute growers who were lured to West Pakistan to establish jute plantations. Land unsuitable. Settlers persecuted. Returned to Dacca as paupers.

AFTERNOON IN BLIGHTED CITY
(Dacca - March Circa, 1971)
Alamgir Kabir

Deserted streets
Only breathless stray dogs
roamed in fierce midday sun.
Airless spaces
rose like tombs in ghost city
Cinnamon hue of human plasma
from night before
cracked on concrete slabs,
Evaporating, oxidizing gradually.
Powdery dust settled
like mime's make-up
Softly on bottle-green leaves, grey grass-blades.
The city dozed like
anaesthetized prehistoric whale.
History created
Thousand years of it. That night
Peasants, workers,
Bellbottoms, bare navels, writers, bankers, students
Endless human wall. One voice
Freedom now. Emancipation later!
Lamp posts. Antennas. House-tops like pincushions
tree twigs. Scaffoldings. Telephone poles
against hazy, camel hide sky
of volk-yellow afternoon.
Dance of the silhouettes
Until violet nightfall.
Suddenly. Again
Cry of Freedom seared angry city's unnatural hush
Automatic rattle blew in like semi-colons
More blood. More martyrs.
Freedom purer.

From the Weekly Express
Friday, March 19, 1971

A MONODY FOR THE MARTYRS
Thomas Ansell

How long can a day be? Twenty-four hours
A week, a month or year - or eternity?
Sometimes it seems to have magical powers;
At others, its less than a minute to me.

Today it is longer than time as it crawls
A crab on wet sand to leave scarcely a mark;
The day is all daylight and the night, when it falls,
Is hewn from obsidian, solid and dark.

The city is sleeping, the houses fast-closed,
No traffic is plying; no human is seen;
The whole land is locked in subjective repose,
An unshuttered film on a cinema screen.

No children are playing, their cries are not heard;
There's nothing, but nothing, not even a note
To break the monotony; only a bird
That sings with a bubble of blood in its throat.

From the Weekly Express
Friday, March 19, 1971

Eye Witness Account (cont.)

17.

LIST OF PROFESSORS AND SENIOR TB

DACCA, EAST PAKISTAN, ON MARCH 25

1. Professor A. Jazzaque (58) (related times, April 13). Political Science; O visiting professor and fellow, Harvard, universities; Distinguished political
2. Professor A.B.M. Habibullah (59) (Islamic History and Culture; Dean of t ally known Indologist and Orientalist.
3. Professor Innas Ali (48) (wounded b eath reported). Chairman Physics Dept
4. Professor Muzaffar Choudhury (48). suffered several adverses during Ayub Kh academic rank, but was restored to form (1969).
5. Professor G.C. Dev (60+) (confirmed Philosophy Dept.; Internationally know philosopher in his own right; there ch propagates his views summed up in several times visiting professor in U.S
6. Professor M.N. Huda (54) (reported ported dead). Chairman Economics Dep mission, Pakistan, Minister of Finan
7. Professor Wafizullah Kabir (48) (co rman History Dept.; Known as simpl tical views.
8. Dr. Sarwar Murshid (48) (confirmed) m to be active in politics.
9. Dr. M. Muniruzzaman (47) (confirmed cious; moderately activist, but no gue. Elder brother of Dr. Hasan Zama
10. His purpose is to integrate the two w. Muniruzzaman was most brutally killed and shot. His wife carried his body again and finished killing him.
11. Dr. Jotirmoy Gnhathakurta (50) (conf st Jagannath Hall.
12. Dr. K. Hussain (confirmed). Reader; Dr. Mukhtadir (confirmed).
13. Dr. Kader; Geology Dept.
14. Dr. Hai, Jr. (confirmed)
15. Further identity not known)
16. A. Rashid
17. Further identity not known)
18. A. Bhattacharya
19. Department of Physics.
20. A. Sharif
21. Further identity not known)
22. Professor Jogesh Chanda Ghosh (86)
23. Time Professor Bhagalpur College
24. Dacca. Founder of Shadhana Au
25. Dr. Patent Medicines. A multimitil

Eye Witness Account (cont.) 17.
LIST OF PROFESSORS AND SENIOR TEACHERS REPORTED KILLED IN
Dacca, EAST PAKISTAN, ON MARCH 25th & 26th, 1971.

Professor A. Izzaque (56) (related in eye witness account, London
mes, April 13). Political Science; One time member Planning Board;
sitting professor and fellow, Harvard, Cambridge and several other
iversities; Distinguished political thinker and analyst.

Professor A.B.M. Habibullah (59) (confirmed) Chairman Dept. of
amic History and Culture; Dean of the Faculty of Arts; Internation-
ly known Indologist and Orientalist.

Professor Innas Ali (48) (wounded but alive on March 27. Later,
ath reported). Chairman Physics Dept.; One time member Pakistan
omic Energy Commission; Several times Dean.

Professor Muzaffar Choudhury (48). Chairman Political Science Dept;
ffered several adverses during Ayub Khan's rule, including demotion in
ademic rank, but was restored to former position during Ahyas time
969).

Professor G.C. Dev (60+) (confirmed by all accounts). Chairman
ilosophy Dept.; Internationally known scholar in Indian Philosophy;
philosopher in his own right; There is a foundation in the States
ich propagates his views summed up in the concept "Unity in Diversity".
veral times visiting professor in U.S. universities.

Professor M.N. Huda (54) (reported wounded at first, but later
ported dead). Chairman Economics Dept.; One time: Member Planning
mission, Pakistan, Minister of Finance (during Ayub period), Governor
Part Pakistan, Chancellor of Dacca University.

Professor Mafizullah Kabir (48) (confirmed)
Chairman History Dept.; Known as simple academic; had no known
political views.

Dr. Sarwar Murshid (48) (confirmed) Chairman English Dept.; Wife
own to be active in politics.

Dr. M. Muniruzzaman (47) (confirmed). Chairman Statistics Dept.;
religious; moderately activist, but no known involvement with Awami
League. Elder brother of Dr. Hasan Zaman, Director Pakistan Council,
ose purpose is to integrate the two wings of Pakistan;

Muniruzzaman was most brutally killed. He was taken to his front
and shot. His wife carried his body inside and revived him. The
siders had second thoughts and returned. They dragged him to the
and again and finished killing him.

Dr. Jotirmoy Gnhathakurta (50) (confirmed) Reader, English Dept.;

Post Jagannath Hall.

Dr. K. Hussain (confirmed). Reader, Physics Dept.

Dr. Muktadir (confirmed).

Reader; Geology Dept.

Dr. Hai, Jr. (confirmed)
(further identity not known)

Dr. A. Rashid
(further identity not known)

Dr. A. Bhattacharya

Department of Physics.

Dr. A. Sharif

(further identity not known)

Professor Jogesh Chanda Ghosh (86)

One time Professor Bhagalpur College, India. Principal, Jagannath
College, Dacca. Founder of Shadhana Aushadhalaya, the house of
Arvedic Patent Medicines. A multimillionaire and noted philanthropist.

(The report itself has been edited solely for considerations of space.)

Commentary.

From May 30 to June 11 1971 a 10 man World Bank mission visited East Pakistan. One month later on 10 July the World Bank President, Robert McNamara, prohibited the mission's written report from being distributed to the Pakistan Aid Consortium for whom it was prepared. On July 21, the Pakistan Times, an English language daily newspaper published in West Pakistan, reported on its front page a letter of apology from McNamara to Yahya Khan regretting that excerpts from the "biased and provocative report" had appeared publicly (in the New York Times).

The official reports of the World Bank missions are scarcely radical pamphlets, so what was it that led McNamara, the former U.S. Secretary for Defence under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, to suppress the report?

The report leaves no doubt that it was the damning nature of the comprehensive and detailed evidence of deliberate Pakistan Army terror. The fact that this sort of evidence was contained in an official report of such a respectably conservative source was intolerable to the American and Pakistan Governments.

This report was important when it was prepared in June but it is still important for three reasons. Firstly, it strongly emphasizes the long term effects of the destruction. The problem is much greater than caring for the millions of refugees who have fled to India.

Secondly, the coolly factual contents of the report make it plain that it was suppressed not for its bias but for U.S. political reasons. In other words, no matter what humanitarian aid is given to the refugees, the real solution -- the political solution -- will be determined by the political interests of the big powers not by the suffering of the Bengali people.

Thirdly, the circumstances of the report's suppression justify suspicion that the U.S. plans to continue supplying arms to Pakistan as it has been doing since 1967 at the admitted rate of \$10-\$15m. per year.

In an economy where normal living for large masses of people is a hand-to-mouth existence supplemented by food imports, systematic terror that completely disrupts production in the whole society is no temporary hardship but a catastrophe. For Bangla Desh the food deficit because of the civil war is all the more terrible as it comes within months of the worst cyclone of the 20th. century that devastated the rice producing coast and killed 500,000 people.

The report concentrates entirely upon economic facts yet it was still condemned. It talks about the state of agriculture and industry, transport and communications, taxation and banking. It presents the evidence with almost disgusting coolness and lack of passion.

It does not relate the immense human suffering behind its economic facts of what percentage of shops and houses were burnt down, what percentage of crops were unharvested, what percentage of factories were idle. It does not refer to the vast numbers of refugees crossing into India -- now numbering three quarters of Australia's entire population. Yet despite its understatement and academic aloofness, McNamara called it unnecessarily provocative on a delicate subject.

If we needed to be reminded that governments and their proxies lie and prevaricate when it suits them to do so, here again is that reminder. Unable to deny the facts revealed by the mission and it being not desirable to discredit the efficient report of his own organisation, McNamara sought to prevent the information from becoming public. It comes as no surprise then that at this very time secret arrangements were being completed for the US presidential adviser, Kissinger, to visit China via West Pakistan.

Since 1967 the United States has supplied much heavy equipment. On July 7, 1971 Senator Frank Church introduced a bill in the Senate that military equipment worth \$55m. would be delivered to Pakistan. Presumably some of the B-57 bombers, the four maritime reconnaissance jet fighters, and the 300 armoured personnel carrier transporters, and the 300 APC's would be especially the 300 APC's would be eminently suitable for insurgency war against the Bangla Desh guerrillas in late October or November.

After the United States secret war in Laos and Cambodia in the Gulf of Tonkin that led to the Vietnam incident the most accurate premise to judge about its military aid is utter disbelief. It is proved. What happened to this report is just to show that the disbelief about US statements to the Indo-China area but also to Pakistan.

R E P O R T

This report is based upon information twelve-day visit to East Pakistan in Bank Mission consisting of the following (stay in brackets):

- L.P.M. Cargill, Director, South Asia Division
- John W. Gunter, Acting Director, Middle East Division
- IMF (June 6-10)
- Manfred G. Blobel, Chief Economist, South Asia Division (June 5-10)
- William H. Edwards, Agricultural Specialist, South Asia Division (May 30-June 11)
- IBRD (May 30-June 11)
- Douglas H. Keare, Economist, Dacca Office
- Shigemitsu Krjyama, Asst. Resident Representative, South Asia Division (May 31-June 10)
- J. Hanns Pichler, Economist, Islamabad Office
- John W. Rose, Economist, IMF (May 31-June 10)
- Hendrik van der Heijden, Economist, Middle East Division
- Michael H. Wiehen, Chief, Pakistan Division

During our visit we spent sometime in Dacca and travelled frequently in the immediate vicinity of one to three, visited twelve of the nineteen districts of Pakistan -- some of them more than once.

The information for this report was obtained in more-or-less the normal way -- that is, in questions, filtering answers and figures of information obtained for accuracy and consistency, that concerning actions by the Army (activity) is technically hearsay in that it is statements or reports made available to us. Matters is necessary in order to round out the picture of East Pakistan, and we have included only what we heard (for ourselves or which has come from others) which appears consistent with the effects

Since 1967 the United States has supplied much of the Pakistan Army's heavy equipment. On July 7, 1971 Senator Frank Church said in the U.S. Senate that military equipment worth \$55m. was still in the pipeline for delivery to Pakistan. Presumably some of this equipment is the seven B-57 bombers, the four maritime reconnaissance aircraft, the six F-104 jet fighters, and the 300 armoured personnel carriers promised by the US government to Pakistan in October, 1970. All of this equipment, especially the 300 APC's would be eminently suitable for counter-insurgency war against the Bangla Desh guerrillas once the monsoon stops in late October or November.

After the United States secret war in Laos and its manufactured incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that led to the bombing of North Vietnam the most accurate premise to judge Government statements about its military aid is utter disbelief until the contrary is proved. What happened to this report is just one piece of evidence to show that the disbelief about US statements should apply not only to the Indo-China area but also to Pakistan.

R. R. SMITH.

REPORT

This report is based upon information gathered during a twelve-day visit to East Pakistan in early June by a World Bank Mission consisting of the following members (length of stay in brackets):

- L.P.M.Cargill, Director, South Asia Department, IBRD (June 6-10)
- John W. Gunter, Acting Director, Middle Eastern Department, IMF (June 6-10)
- Manfred G. Blobel, Chief Economist, South Asia Department, IBRD (June 5-10)
- William H. Edwards, Agricultural Specialist, Islamabad Office, IBRD (May 30-June 11)
- Douglas H. Keare, Economist, Dacca Office, IBRD (May 30-June 11)
- Shigemitsu Krjyama, Asst. Resident Representative, Dacca Office, IBRD (May 31-June 10)
- J. Hanns Pichler, Economist, Islamabad Office, IBRD (May 30-June 10)
- John W. Rose, Economist, IMF (May 31-June 10)
- Hendrik van der Heijden, Economist, Pakistan Division, IBRD (May 31-June 10)
- Michael H. Wiehen, Chief, Pakistan Division, IBRD (May 31-June 10)

During our visit we spent sometime in Dacca holding discussions with officials, travelled frequently in the immediate vicinity of Dacca and, in parties of one to three, visited twelve of the nineteen administrative districts of East Pakistan -- some of them more than once.

The information for this report was obtained, though not in normal circumstances, in more-or-less the normal way -- that is, by travelling, observing, asking questions, filtering answers and figures obtained and evaluating the information obtained for accuracy and consistency. Some information, (for instance, that concerning actions by the Army and the extent of insurgent activity) is technically hearsay in that it was not contained in official statements or reports made available to us; however, some treatment of these matters is necessary in order to round out a description of the situation in

The disruption of commerce was just-as-complete and fundamental, and here too, the road to "normalcy" has proved elusive. During the period of conflict, many village markets were destroyed and economically important groups within the population -- such as Beparis, or up-country jute traders -- have virtually disappeared.

In all spheres, the severity of the disruption -- and its persistence -- are due much more to psychological than to physical factors. This is nowhere more true than in industry. With very few exceptions -- a couple of jute warehouses burnt in Chittagong, one tea factory in Sylhet, one tea chest factory in Chittagong, the paper mill at Tongi -- the damage to physical plant of large factories has been slight. In any case, the major factors affecting industry now, and likely to persist for some time to come, are loss of management and labor, financial problems, the inability to obtain supplies, and the inability to sell and transport finished product.

Managerial staff and labor who have fled to the villages have been slow to return. They are probably intimidated both by the continuing presence and actions of the Army and by threats from the insurgents that they should not support the latter's cause by returning to work. Those who have returned remain frightened; and the appearance of threatening posters put up by the Insurgents has caused serious setbacks to recruiting efforts.

The heaviest fighting and greatest destruction by the Army took place West of the Jamuna/Padma -- with the trail of devastation running from Khulna to Jessore, to Kushitia to Pabna, Bogra, and Dinajpur. This is the area of greatest population loss at present and where agriculture has been most retarded and activity most disrupted. Least affected apparently were the southern and coastal areas of Noakhali, Bakarganj and Patuakhali. Though the fighting started there, Dacca, as the capital city and administrative center, is probably closest to "normal" at present; however, one similarity for all districts is that all had remained very far from normal up to the time of our departure from East Pakistan on June 11.

Effects On the Major Economic Sectors.

Agriculture: Although the Mission did not observe major physical damage to this sector, it is clear that agriculture has suffered badly as a result of the conflict. Many farmers have fled; others have been killed; all farmers have lost some time in the fields; and in all areas there have been in all farm operations delays, unavoidable neglect and a lack of inputs.

More seriously, it appears from all indications that the important aman crop may also be considerably depleted. If this is to be avoided, severe problems of delay, lack of seed and difficulty in providing inputs will have to be overcome. In general, the entire process of aman planting appears to be seriously behind schedule. For highest yields transplanting from mid-July to mid-August -- but preferably in mid-July -- is recommended. Allowing for one month in the nurseries, this means that seedlings should have gone into the nurseries by mid-June; however, very little preparation of fields or nursery beds was observed during our various tours of the Province.

For a variety of reasons -- The firing of farmers' houses and market places, Army "requisitioning", the flight of refugees who have taken seed stock with them for food, etc. -- much aman seed appears to have been lost throughout the Province. And, given the disruption of administration and the transport and distribution system, it appears vain to hope that all the lost seed can be replaced or that sufficient seed can be supplied to normally deficit areas in time for the aman planting. Though fertilizer is available in the province, point-of-use storage is in most cases adequate for only a few days' requirements during the growing season. As the entire process depends so critically upon the transport and distribution system it appears most unlikely that fertilizer will be available in all the right places at the right times. Timely pesticide application, which is difficult in normal times, can

B. Minimum Conditions for Normalization.

In the present political circumstances, it is impossible to predict what might constitute a sufficient set of conditions for a normalization process to begin. There are, however, a number of necessary conditions which -- it would seem -- would have to be put in any case.

Firstly, it is most unlikely that any significant movement in the direction of normality will occur until there is a drastic reduction in the visibility -- and preferably, even the presence -- of the military and a re-establishment of normal civilian administration in East Pakistan. Secondly, the food problem must be solved. For the present, this means programming the massive imports which will be required over the next six -- and perhaps the next twelve -- months, and re-establishing -- by some combination of permanent and temporary measures -- an adequate transport and distribution system. Thirdly, any remaining available resources must be directed first to rehabilitation and reconstruction -- and to breaking the most important and most persistent physical and organizational bottlenecks impeding efforts to get the economy going again.

Dacca, East Pakistan

President Yahya Khan's attempt to a rising tide of separatist feeling among Pakistan conceals a much older struggle communities of the Indian sub-continent verily disfigured by their often murder

There is no longer any serious dispa Pakistan, who account for about 12 perce 10 million, have been the most consistan in the past three months. Visible evide however the army has been. There is al which by its nature is no longer capable of which such can be reasonably be suppo

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CORRESPONDENTS REPORT

BANGLA DESH - THE QUICKSAND

by Michael Hornsby.

(Reprinted in the Financial Review - 29/9/71)

East Pakistan

President Yahya Khan's attempt to stem by armed force the tide of separatist feeling among the Bengalis of East Pakistan conceals a much older struggle among the Hindu and Muslim peoples of the Indian sub-continent whose history has been gloriously disfigured by their often murderous rivalry

There is no longer any serious dispute that the Hindus of East Pakistan, who account for about 12 percent of a total population of 40 million, have been the most consistent targets of army action for the past three months. Visible evidence for this is to be found in the actions of the army which has been. There is also much hearsay evidence, but by its nature is no longer capable of proof or disproof, but which may be reasonably supposed to have basis in truth.

From the outset, amid such general bullying, the army showed a ruthless discrimination in its selection of targets among the Muslims. These included not only prominent Awami League leaders but also professors, students, lawyers, and Government officials such as police who had thrown in their lot with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his followers. Hindus on the other hand were victims of an altogether indiscriminate and unrestrained policy. There is room for speculation about the precise orders which junior officers were operating. But there can be no doubt that the army's conduct, even in its excesses, reflected a malign reaction at the highest levels that the Hindus were the malign force behind the secessionist movement and had to be taught a savage lesson.

The damage to Hindu property in almost all towns where the army left its mark is disproportionately severe. This can be seen in the systematic burning and looting of Hindu shops and homes. In the case of the non-Hindu population is said to have been compelled to jump into the work of pillage. Towns with large Hindu communities, particularly in the border regions, are visibly looted.

In the countryside Hindu, or predominantly Hindu, villages seem to have been selected by the army for destruction on the grounds of evidence of provocation or even simply in retaliation for acts of sabotage such as the dynamiting of bridges by Bengali guerrillas operating in the rain forest sanctuaries in India.

Reports of raping and looting—neither of which can be said to have any obvious relevance to the restoration of law and order—are rampant and widespread.

At least 80 percent, perhaps 90 percent, of the refugees now in India are Hindus. Fear has been the spur—fear not only of the army but also of the vengeance of Bihari (Non-Bengali) Muslims who are victimized and in some places butchered by Bengali fanatics during the two or three weeks it took the army to secure control of the province.

Under these circumstances it is unrealistic to imagine that anything more than a fraction of the Hindu refugees in India can be persuaded to return. Up to now no more than a trickle has passed through the reception centres established for this purpose in East Pakistan by the martial law administration. A total of 50,000 "returnees" is claimed by the authorities. But it is admitted that no more than a third of these, whose number is in any case certainly much exaggerated, have returned by "recognized routes". The rest, it is alleged, are filtering back unseen at unauthorized crossing points. The Indians, it is further claimed, are forcibly preventing the return of refugees for their own evil designs.

It is unreasonable to expect Hindus to put much faith in President Yahya's public assurance of security and protection. Many West Pakistan officials admit privately that they would consider a "good rideance" if the Hindus who have fled to India were to remain there. The Hindu community in their view is the advance guard of Indian imperialism, the breeding ground of sedition and unrest.

The roots of these antipathies go back way beyond the foundation of Pakistan. In the six centuries before British domination in India Muslim soldiers and administrators ruled over such of a population in which Hindus formed a numerical majority, though mass conversion to Islam in economically backward areas like East Bengal produced local Muslim majorities.

The British replaced Muslim domination with their own. The Muslims furthermore were regarded after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 with suspicion by the British as the instigators of rebellion, while those of the educated and commercial classes began to play an increasing role in public life.

With the approach of independence, partition seemed to be the right answer to the Muslims' fears of domination by Hindu majority. They had been accustomed historically to regard as subjects rather than rulers. Yet it was a solution that was to bring little satisfaction.

For, in the view of West Pakistan, neither Delhi or London has ever fully accepted the division of the sub-continent to which both were parties.

There are, admittedly, some elections of truth in this interpretation of Indian and British attitudes towards Pakistan. Its correspondence with reality however matters less than what it is deeply embedded in the consciousness of senior government officials and army officers and thus represents a well-nigh insuperable obstacle in the way of rational assessment by Islamabad of the situation with which it is confronted in the Eastern wing.

The rulers in West Pakistan are irrevocably convinced that separatist aspirations among the Bengalis are without genuine foundation. They see them as the product of merely ephemeral agitation artfully incited by a few extremists in the Awami League working hand in glove with Hindus, Indian infiltrators, and malicious propagandists in the pay of All-Indian Radio, the BBC and the British press. The fact that Bengali units in the armed forces mutinied almost to a man is not allowed to disturb this prevailing conviction. The attitude is a dose of harsh medicine, firmly administered, will soon bring the fickle and volatile Bengalis back into line once the rest of the goes away and finds its own business.

No one with the exception of a few shortsighted people on the periphery of political life seems able to recognize that continued regression of the Bengalis by the army can in the long run only more inevitably what its intervention was designed to prevent: the secession of East Pakistan.

Smoke is still rising from the bed of burning hangs in the rain-sodden air corrugated iron, charred wood and rubble. Here and there men and women hope of salvaging some item of their

Such is "normalcy" in the village. President Yahya Khan's Army. It is down or looted last week in an area so of Dacca - apparently for no other reason inhabitants are predominantly Hindu.

Sinduri lies amid water-logged fields to the main road from Dacca only by a to ordinary vehicles at this time of year.

The Army guided by a Muslim informant arrived by both boat and road in watchman posted by the villagers was a for most of Sinduri's 700 or so inhabitants.

Not all were lucky. Radhabindoo and other men and one old woman were shot.

The soldiers then systematically dwelling and hut. One of the main targets Meghal Sarkar, a prosperous Hindu Jutt to have given money to the Mukti Fauj. Unless the merchant was turned over within return and kill every Hindu we can find also sacked.

Now three days later, the holdings ing fearfully to what remains of their away as we approached. All were obvious return.

Boliadi, a village of more than visited by the Army last week.

Four people were killed, 14 girls and money, gold and ornaments stolen.

Four other villages of similar names Radhanagar, Attaha and Tekerbari - were last week. Two more, Bhiringray and S destroyed. Four people were killed in

The information about what happened reliable local informants whose identities cannot be revealed. Wherever possible the-spot investigation and found it

The fate of Sinduri and the other proof of a continuing calculated persecution of East Pakistan by the armed forces. Evidence that any of the villages offered an Army. No conceivable strategic could and to justify what it did.

of Vengeance

Brahmanbaira, an important provision Tripura border in Comilla district. Helplessness with which the Pakistan Army suppress what it regarded as a secession

The People Who Could Not Escape

from Michael Hornsby.

Smoke is still rising from the blackened ruins. The stench of burning hangs in the rain-soaked air above the heaps of buckled and charred iron, charred wood and rubble that had once been homes. And there men and women peered about among the debris in the hope of salvaging some item of their belongings.

Such is "normalcy" in the village of Sinduri under the rule of the present Yahya Khan's Army. It is one of eight such placed burned or looted last week in an area some 40 miles to the north-west of Dacca - apparently for no other reason than that their inhabitants are predominantly Hindu.

Sinduri lies amid water-logged jute fields and is connected to the main road from Dacca only by a narrow causeway impassable for ordinary vehicles at this time of year.

The Army guided by a Muslim informer from Dacca named Matlab arrived by both boat and road in the early hours. A night watchman posted by the villagers was able to raise the alarm in time to save most of Sinduri's 700 or so inhabitants to flee.

Not all were lucky. Radhabinod Karmakar, a goldsmith, seven of his men and one old woman were shot down. Four girls were raped.

The soldiers then systematically destroyed almost every building and hut. One of the main targets was the house of Lal Sarkar, a prosperous Hindu jute merchant, alleged by the Army to have given money to the Mukti Fauj. The villagers were told that unless the merchant was turned over within eight days the Army would burn and kill every Hindu we can find. A small Hindu temple was also sacked.

Now three days later, the boldest of the villagers are returning so fearfully to what remains of their homes.

Young girls drew their saris closer about them and scurried away as we approached. All were obviously terrified of the Army's return.

Boliadi, a village of more than 1,000 people close by, was also visited by the Army last week.

Four people were killed, 14 girls raped and left unconscious, and money, gold and ornaments stolen.

Four other villages of similar size in the same region - Chandra-naganagar, Attabha and Tekerbari - were also burnt down by the Army last week. Two more, Bhiringraj and Sewratoli, were looted but not destroyed. Four people were killed in these operations.

The information about what happened to them comes from reliable local informants whose identity, for obvious reasons, cannot be revealed, wherever possible I checked what I was told by on-the-spot investigation and found it to be accurate.

The fate of Sinduri and the other villages is incontrovertible proof of a continuing calculated persecution of the Hindu community in East Pakistan by the armed forces. There is absolutely no evidence that any of the villages offered provocation of any kind to the Army. No conceivable strategic or security reasons can be found to justify what it did.

The People Who Could Not Escape (cont.)

destruction wrought in the town - possibly the most devastated in East Bengal - can only be described as an act of vengeance since Army Officers themselves admit that no resistance was encountered when their units moved into Brahmanbaria in mid-April.

Little attempt if any has been made to repair the damage to town - a drive of some 50 miles from the district capital of Comilla. On either side of the main streets entire blocks of shops had been systematically gutted and destroyed. Several of the cars that formed round us as soon as we left the car whispered that the blackened rubble-filled shells had mainly belonged to the town's formerly sizable but now virtually non-existent Hindu community. Fate of Hindus.

The fate of the Hindus, who may have accounted for 30% to 40% of a total population of some 50,000, is not clear. Some doubtless were killed. But the majority, with ample warning of the Army's arrival, would have had time to flee across the border in India.

Elsewhere in the town the evidence of destruction was very visible. Some buildings had been totally demolished, including appeared to have been two timber mills. In other streets, their buildings for the most part closed and shuttered, only one or two houses had been selected - apparently deliberately - for destruction by the Army. They had usually belonged, as far as we could gather to Hindus or to Muslims associated with the Awami League (whose leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is now in prison in West Pakistan).

The crowd that followed us about, though visibly frightened and nervous was clearly anxious to talk. I can tell you many things but you are being followed", one man whispered and then melted in the crowd after looking furtively over his shoulder.

Eventually we were led into a tea shop by a young man who spoke hesitant English. We sat down at a table surrounded by about 50 of the people who had been trailing after us in the curiously bland and expressionless manner that can seem unnerveingly like hostility but is usually only curiosity.

The young man began to tell us how his mother and niece had been shot down by Pakistani soldiers while running in fear from a village near Brahmanbaria. He had not been talking for more than a few minutes before two men suddenly materialized beside our table and uninvited sat down. Our informant, visibly agitated by this turn of events, excused himself on the grounds of another appointment and slipped away.

Peace Committee.

The two newcomers introduced themselves as Syed Mohammad Ali the manager of a cooperative bank, and Mr. Haridur Rahman, the younger of the two who said that he was a lawyer. They both said they were members of the Brahmanbaria "peace committee" (Peace committees have been organized by the Army in most towns in an attempt to create at least the simulation of a civilian administration. Their members, usually drawn from the old Muslim League and other "loyal" Parties thoroughly defeated by the Awami League at the elections, are regarded as quislings by many Bengalis. The chairman of three or four peace committees we were told by reliable informants, have been assassinated in Comilla district alone).

The two committee men told us that the young man we had been talking to was the "brother of a miscreant". The damage to the town, they assured us was the work of other "miscreants". Sure protested this could hardly explain such extensive devastation. They conceded that the Army probably had to "clean up a few miscreants" when it entered the town.

The miscreants in question were the soldiers of a battalion of the East Bengal Regiment which controlled the Brahmanbaria region for about three weeks after March 25. The battalion, like other Bengali units, threw in its lot almost to a man with the Bangladeshi

The People Who Could Not Escape (cont.)

independence movement after President Y

to intervene. A commotion in the street interrupted Pakistan Army officer had drawn up in a "expecting you", the officer cried, "strive you had a good talk to these people?"

We were taken back to battalion headquarters and some curried shrimps. News of our by the colonel commanding the Brahmanbaria had been involved in a minor collision. The Army is very obviously under orders for the time being.

Our officer, Captain Suhayl Ghanem Regiment, spun the familiar yarn about about British Press coverage of recent a small and frightened Bengali who purport battalion of the East Bengal Regiment that were taken back to our car. As we drove handed us a roughly pencilled note badly

"Dear Sir,

We are not allowed to speak with the soldiers will kill us if we speak the truth are lying to you. Whatever Haridur Rahman is a betrayer and a member of the Muslim soldiers killed many Bengali men, women, they killed many lecturers, doctors, etc schools, banks houses of ordinary people they are enemies of Bengalis. We have They tortured many girls, women, schoolgirls villages and killed people while coming I wrote very hurriedly. Thank you on behalf of the people".

Sunduri, East Bengal.

"The Sunday Statesman", July 4, 1971. R

SEVENTEEN DAYS WITH THE

The guerrillas usually hit the Pak attacks.

The camp has been set up in a thicket after we see a patrol moving out into the machine guns and mortars.

The camp, which snacks of military tents, a marquee, a kitchen, and two guerrillas - all volunteers and former soldiers - are at company strength under the officer who was trained at the military academy in Pakistan.

The commander, who cannot be named Dacca, says that there are nine other guerrillas in the area. He would like to hear the sound of Morse from a neighborly guerrilla commander explains that he has radio communication with the Major Osman Choudhury, commander of the guerrillas in the area.

The former Pakistan Army captain in the area will not accept any political settlement. "There can be no going back to the way things were before March 25. We have lost too many lives, and what has happened to their families, and to their complete freedom".

The People Who Could Not Escape (cont.)

independence movement after President Yahya Khan ordered the Army to intervene.

A commotion in the street interrupted our conversation. A Pakistan Army officer had drawn up in a jeep. "We have been expecting you", the officer cried, striding into the shop. "Have you had a good talk to those people? You must see how happy they are".

We were taken back to battalion headquarters for a cup of tea and some curried shrimps. News of our arrival had been telephoned to the colonel commanding the Brahmanbaria area with whose car we had been involved in a minor collision on the way to the town. The Army is very obviously under orders to be nice to journalists at the time being.

Our officer, Captain Suhayl Gilani of the Frontier Force Regiment, spun the familiar yarn about "miscreants" and complained that British Press coverage of recent events. He finally produced a small and frightened Bengali who purported to be a returnee from a battalion of the East Bengal Regiment that mutinied in March. We were taken back to our car. As we drove out of the town our driver handed us a roughly pencilled note badly spelt which said:

Dear Sir,
We are not allowed to speak with journalists. The Pakistani officers will kill us if we speak the truth. The Muslim Leaders are lying to you. Whatever Hamidur Rahman has said is wrong. He is a betrayer and a member of the Muslim League. The Pakistani officers killed many Bengali men, women, children and intellectuals. They killed many lecturers, doctors, etc. They looted missionary schools, banks houses of ordinary people. They looted golds. They are enemies of Bengalis. We have no connection with them. They tortured many girls, women, school mistresses, nurses, burnt houses and killed people while coming out of the burning house. They are very hurriedly. Thank you on behalf of the tortured Bengali people.
Suhayl,
Lieutenant,
East Bengal.

"Sunday Statesman", July 4, 1971. Reprinted from London Times.

SEVENTEEN DAYS WITH THE REBELS

The guerrillas usually hit the Pakistan posts in hit and run tactics.

The camp has been set up in a thick grove of trees. As we walk we see a patrol moving out into the jungle with rifles, sub-machine guns and mortars.

The camp, which snacks of military efficiency, consists of a long line of tents, a marquee, a kitchen, and two rows of latrines. The latrines - all volunteers and former members of the East Pakistan Army - are at company strength under the command of a former sergeant who was trained at the military academy at Kakul in West Bengal.

The commander, who cannot be named because his family is still in the area, says that there are nine other camps in this sector. We hear the sound of Morse from a neighbouring tent, and the commander explains that he has radio communications with other camps in the sector. The commander of the south-west sector.

Seventeen Days with the Rebels (cont.)

He admits that the West Pakistan Army has pushed the guerrillas out of all the main towns but says that the liberation front has managed to open up several small enclaves which are now under the control of the Bangladesh Government. He claims that the guerrillas drove the Army out of this particular area about a month ago and the liberation front controls an enclave of about 140 square miles.

His officers offer to take us out with a patrol to inspect the enclave ourselves. We set out in single file with guerrillas armed with Chinese AK47 sub-machineguns and 303 rifles. As we march through jute and paddy fields, torrential monsoon rains begin to fall and the area is soon a sea of mud and water.

The West Pakistanis will find it impossible to use mechanized weapons or bring any form of vehicle into this territory. As we cross the frontier near a cement beacon we find ourselves in ankle-deep mud and water, and we are forced to remove our shoes and march on bare feet.

After about one hour's march we are shown a row of bunkers. They are manned by former members of the East Pakistan Rifles, in khaki uniforms and wearing steel helmets. They are armed with machineguns and mortars.

As we march on we pass a small burnt-out shop. The guerrillas say that Pakistan Rangers looted it before they were pushed out of the area last month. We go through some small villages which bear no signs of destruction or strife. The guerrillas point to a poster on a shop wall. Translated literally it reads; "Kill the Rumours and Kill the enemy."

There is no sign of a Pakistani military presence. We march on parallel to the border and then back towards an isolated border observation post. The building has been burnt out and is in a state of ruin. The lieutenant commanding the patrol says that the Pakistanis wrecked the outpost before they were forced to retreat southwards.

He tells us that a platoon of freedom fighters are holding the post at present. Pointing to the Kapotaksha river below, he explains that the guerrillas control the entire area along the river for six miles on either side of the post.

The lieutenant asks us not to identify the area because the villagers might suffer if the Army were to launch a large-scale attack on the region. He admits that the Army could force the guerrillas out of the enclave if they advanced in great numbers, explains that to do so the West Pakistanis would have to pull the hard pressed troops out of other strategic areas, which would then be vulnerable to guerrilla activity.

When we return to the secret base, the commander outlines his aims: "We are not planning to confront the Army directly. When they advance we retreat and look for other weak spots. I have four objectives - to harass them as much as possible, to inflict many casualties as possible, to disrupt their communications and demoralize them in general".

The former Captain, who has been promoted to the rank of Major, says that he conducted his most successful raid on Pakistani positions at border observations post two nights ago. "We attacked them with mortars and then encircled their bunkers. We launched a surprise attack from the rear and destroyed the bunkers with hand grenades".

The commander describes how his men move out at night to roads and destroy bridges and telephones. "We haven't had a single casualty in this area so far", he adds.

The commander states that arms and equipment seized by his force include 10 sub-machineguns, three light machineguns, 17 m-

Seventeen Days with the Rebels (cont)
two vehicles. He declares "We have enough for six months, and morale is high."
He denies reports that the Indian liberation front's heavy weapons - battle artillery pieces which the liberation front captured in an earlier phase of the civil war.

There is evidence that a damage developing. The guerrilla commander says "Well the world what we are fighting we can see our families again, for the first time in peace. Until that is achieved we will continue to fight."

INSIDE BENGAL
THE TERROR WITH TWO

Dacca, July 9

The Pakistan Army, although in Pakistan, faces a continuing threat to get worse rather than better. The road is along the hilly border with Tripura suitable terrain for guerrilla activities.

The railway, running along the Chittagong through Comilla to Sylhet, has been cut for more than two months. Feni, south of Comilla, was dynamited and repaired.

Other road and rail bridges in use temporarily. Savage reprisals against the nearest villages irrespective of inhabitants were responsible for the claimed not to be official policy.

Farther north an electric power Comilla was without electricity for several days. It has now been restored.

Cars on the Comilla-Brahmanbaria road are being used to transport some of it possibly from across the border. Residents in Comilla report considerable damage to some of it possibly from across the border.

The army recently ordered the evacuation of the territory along the frontier at this point. The evacuation was effected effectively with guerrilla raids.

In the Sylhet sector, road and rail targets of sabotage. The roads have been some shelling of the gardens lying north and south of the district. Plans on their estates and have moved into the area.

There is still no news of the fact that the Indian army was said to have been kidnapped by the Indian army) and taken across the border.

Pakistan Army officers say that the Indian installations shows evidence of sabotage. They suggest that this can mean only that the Indians would risk the capture of the border.

Bengali infantry units, which must be kept away from the Indian soil. They are being used to sabotage techniques and are being supplied.

Seventeen Days with the Rebels (cont.)

two vehicles. He declares "We have plenty of ammunition, more than enough for six months, and morale is high".

He denies reports that the Indians are controlling the liberation front's heavy weapons - but there is no sign of the artillery pieces which the liberation front captured during the earlier phase of the civil war.

There is evidence that a dangerous situation on the border is developing. The guerrilla commander points to his men and says: "Tell the world what we are fighting for. We are fighting so that we can see our families again, for the right to live on our own and in peace. Until that is achieved we shall continue to fight".

INSIDE BENGAL :
THE TERROR WITH TWO FACES

Dacca, July 9

The Fakistan Army, although in effective control of East Pakistan, faces a continuing threat to security that promises to get worse rather than better. The main trouble area at the moment is along the hilly border with Tripura and Assam, which affords suitable terrain for guerrilla activity.

The railway, running along the frontier from the port of Chittagong through Comilla to Sylhet and serving Dacca en route, has been cut for more than two months. The main span of a bridge at Feni, south of Comilla, was dynamited expertly and has yet to be repaired.

Other road and rail bridges in the area have been put out of use temporarily. Savage reprisals are usually taken by the army against the nearest villages irrespective of whether their inhabitants were responsible for the damage, although this is claimed not to be official policy.

Farther north an electric power pylon was sabotaged so that Comilla was without electricity for some days. The supply has now been restored.

Cars on the Comilla-Brahmanbaria road are fired on sometimes. Residents in Comilla report considerable noise of firing most nights, some of it possibly from across the border which is only a few miles away.

The army recently ordered the evacuation of a swathe of territory along the frontier at this point to be able to deal more effectively with guerrilla raids.

In the Sylhet sector, road and rail bridges have again been targets of sabotage. The roads have been mined and there has been some shelling of the gardens lying along the frontier in the north and south of the district. Planters no longer dare to live on their estates and have moved into the interior.

There is still no news of the fate of two British planters who were said to have been kidnapped by the Mukti Fowj (Liberation Army) and taken across the border.

Pakistan Army officers say that the damage to bridges and other installations shows evidence of considerable sapper skill. They suggest that this can mean only that Indian Army engineers are actively engaged. Most observers, however, think it unlikely that

In the interior, the Army is in control with the exception of a few pockets. The Madhupur forest preserve in Mymensingh district has been the scene of Army operations for some weeks. The authorities say that they are searching for the remnants of the mutinous East Bengal Regiment, prisoners released from jails during the March-April period and assorted "miscellaneous". Independent sources confirm that outlaw bands of some kind are at large in the area.

The Army is also active in the Noakhali district, situated in the southeast above Chittagong. Here, according to the Army, in a mesh of delta waterways inaccessible by road at this time of year, supporters of the Communist Party of East Pakistan (Marxist-Leninist) are holding out.

This group, of undetermined strength, has preached the use of armed guerrilla tactics and subversion for some years and shares or at least used to share, the slogan 'Chairman Mao is our chairman' with the Naxalites (Maoists) in West Bengal. Hitherto it has never had much popular support.

In Dacca, as in other towns, there has been a marked increase in guerrilla incidents in recent weeks, mainly bomb throwing.

Members of 'peace committees' - groups of civilians in the towns and countryside who have agreed to cooperate with the Army in restoring 'normalcy' - are threatened and quite frequently assassinated. Only 10 such killings are admitted by the authorities but the real figure is certainly much higher. Anyone - civil servant or jute mill manager - who cooperates too enthusiastically with the military puts himself at risk.

An attempt is being made to establish a locally based militia of Razakars or volunteers - an experiment that has some not very encouraging parallels in South Vietnam. They wear no uniforms, carry .303 rifles and are paid three rupees a day.

Their duties include guarding installations such as bridges and electric power stations as well as keeping the military informed about the activities of 'miscellaneous' and 'anti-state elements'.

Many of them are little more than thugs glad of an opportunity to settle old scores. Some had charges for rape and theft pending against them which were dropped when they agreed to become Razakars. They are obvious targets for assassination and certain to promote rebel activity.

The independence of East Pakistan as a movement for economic autonomy within Pakistan has been irrevocably transformed into a movement for the independence of East Pakistani civilians into a movement to produce an independent East Pakistan of time. A complete discussion of this movement would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic, and economic and political bases of disaffection. This paper has a more limited scope. It suggests the likely implications for the future of Pakistan.

In brief, the fact of a large and standard of living between the two regions is testable. Even the West Pakistani-dominant average income in the West, and he faces East Pakistanis argue that income disparity of a systematic subordination of the East to those of the West; specifically, the allocation of foreign exchange - both East Pakistani Jute and that provided ately favors West Pakistan; that all reinforcement the income disparity; and quotas raise prices to East Pakistanis and jobs in West Pakistan.

We believe that in the main the Pakistani government policies have at inequalities that arise from an uneven resources between the two regions, and the benefits of economic development to the West.

The political program of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, endorsed by the people of East Pakistan, sought to correct these disparities through control over economic policy from the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan government was to unleash a region of terror whose full implications are becoming known.

The West Pakistani Army can deliver logistics, coupled with the implacable hostility of the Pakistani government to what has become foreign "Bangla Desh". Apart from the element of interest in an end to further bloodshed with a quick rather than a slow realization of independence in South Asia will be important, tensions in South Asia will be important, a move long desired by both India and Pakistanis who have refused to counter the relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue is too likely to subside because of any reduction in tension in the region. Pakistan without the economic support to sustain the level of pressure it has in short, Bangla Desh will be a truly able to maintain normal relations with full nations of both blocs, but a satellite of the independence of Bangla Desh interests only insofar as American aid

CONFLICT IN EAST PAKISTAN:
BACKGROUND AND PROSPECTS

by

Edward S. Mason Robert Dorfman Stephen A. Marglin*

I

SUMMARY

The independence of East Pakistan is inevitable. What started as a movement for economic autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan has been irrevocably transformed by the wholesale slaughter of East Pakistani civilians into a movement that sooner or later will produce an independent East Pakistan - "Bangla Desh" is a matter of time. A complete discussion of the Pakistani question would include an analysis of cultural, linguistic, and social issues, which along with economics and politics, are at the heart of the present conflict. This paper has a more limited goal; to assess the economic and political bases of disaffection in East Pakistan and to suggest the likely implications for international relations of the break-up of Pakistan.

In brief, the fact of a large and widening gap in the average standard of living between the two regions of the country is incontestable. Even the West Pakistani-dominated Government admits that the average East Pakistani must make do with barely two-thirds the average income in the West, and he faces higher prices too. The East Pakistanis argue that income disparity is largely the result of a systematic subordination of the interests of the Eastern region to those of the West; specifically, the East Pakistanis charge that allocation of foreign exchange - both that earned by the export of East Pakistani Jute and that provided by foreign aid - disproportionately favors West Pakistan; that allocation of domestic investment reinforces the income disparity; and that high tariffs and import quotas raise prices to East Pakistanis in order to provide profits and jobs in West Pakistan.

We believe that in the main the facts support these charges. Pakistan government policies have at the very best exacerbated the inequalities that arise from an uneven distribution of natural resources between the two regions, and a disproportionate share of the benefits of economic development have accrued to West Pakistan.

The political program of Sheikh Mujib's Awami League, overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of East Pakistan in the recent elections, sought to correct these disparities by transferring control over economic policy from the Central Government to the provinces. The response of the Yahya Khan's Government has been to unleash a region of terror whose full dimensions are only gradually becoming known.

The West Pakistani Army can delay independence, but terrain and logistics, coupled with the implacable hostility of the East Pakistanis to what has become foreign domination, are on the side of "Bangla Desh". Apart from the elementary and overwhelming humanitarian interest in an end to further bloodshed, American interest lies with a quick rather than a slow realization of independence. Most important, tensions in South Asia will be reduced. Bangla Desh and India will develop mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations, a move long desired by both sides but frustrated by West Pakistanis who have refused to countenance any normalization of relations in the East as long as the Kashmir issue remains outstanding. The Kashmir issue too is likely to subside in importance, not because of any reduction in its importance, but because of the

inevitable. Economic aid to the Pakistan Government should be immediately suspended. The "one time" exception made last year to the embargo of arms sales and military aid (imposed after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965) should be rescinded. American arms must not be supplied to a government that makes war on helpless civilians.

II

U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN

Since 1951 Pakistan has been a major recipient of U.S. economic aid amounting to approximately \$3 billion by 1969. Except for food aid donated under Public Law 480, the bulk of this assistance has been used to support industrialization in West Pakistan, with only a handful of projects undertaken in East Pakistan.

The quantum of U.S. military aid to Pakistan is a classified figure but two estimates put it between \$1.5 to \$2 billion for the period between 1954 and 1965. The assistance has included F-104 Starfighters, Patton tanks, armoured personnel carriers, automatic and recoilless infantry weapons. This impressive array of modern weaponry was given expressly for defensive purposes. With Pakistan an early member of SEATO and CENTO this military aid was intended to bolster the armed containment of the Communist Bloc in the Dulles era of U.S. foreign policy but apart from the brief border war with India of 1965 the only active use of these sophisticated weapons has occurred against the unarmed and defenseless civilian population of East Pakistan.

The growth and maintenance of the superstructure of the armed forces which was built up with massive U.S. military aid continued after 1965 when the United States decided to put an embargo on the delivery of arms to both Pakistan and India. This was made possible by diverting resources from the much needed development projects. East Pakistan, poorer and less powerful politically than the West, suffered more by this irrational policy.

Surprisingly, the United States has just recently (October 1970) made an exception to its embargo on military sales to Pakistan. According to the information available, the United States has offered to supply Pakistan the following items:

- a. Armoured personnel carriers (approximately 300)
- b. Maritime reconnaissance aircraft (4)
- c. F-104 jet fighters (6)
- d. B-57 bombers (7)

Fortunately, no sales or deliveries have yet been made. It is not too late to rescind the offer, a move that would be of practical as well as symbolic value.

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Robert Dorfman is professor of economics at Harvard University. He has been concerned with the problems of Pakistan development since 1961, when he became a member of the White House-Interior Team appointed by President Kennedy at the request of the then-President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, to advise the Government of Pakistan on problems of water-logging and salinity. Mr. Dorfman has recently been a consultant to the World Bank on the development of the Lower Mekong River Basin.

Stephen A. Marlin is professor of economics at Harvard University. He has advised governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America on problems of economic development, as well as the United States Government, the World Bank and the United Nations.

This article was completed on April 9th, 1971.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DOMINATION

The basic facts seem to support the economic domination by the West. The East and West Pakistan have been so serious that Pakistan government's highest planning take official note of them.

A recent report⁵ by a panel of experts of the Government of Pakistan provides in striking fact in this report is the widening the average West Pakistani and his East Pakistani the per capita income in West Pakistan Over the next ten years the annual rate Pakistan was 6.2% while it was only 4.2% result, by 1969-70 the per capita income than in the East. Thus in ten years the percentage terms; it increased even more.

East Pakistanis blame three instruments of policy for their plight:

1. Pakistan's scant investible resources directed unduly to the development comparative neglect of East Pakistan.
2. In particular, East Pakistan's foreign diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.
3. Economic policy favours West Pakistan. Specifically, tariffs, import controls compel East Pakistan to purchase which, but for the controls, they could markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claim is first, it is indisputable that the bulk of investment in West Pakistan though the majority in the East. With 55% of the population, development expenditure (public and private) during the Third Five-Year Plan period has been a marked upward trend in East Pakistan expenditure from a little over 25% around 45% in the Third Five-Year Plan in the Indus replacement works is exclusive of Pakistan in private investment, however entire period, and has amounted only to Table 1. The allocation of development

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan at the great bulk of worthwhile investment in the West, though the relative attraction of the West, through the relative attraction of the effect of overall government policy, that the fact remains that investments in Pakistan are nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that the great bulk of investment in Pakistan allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. East Pakistan's share of total investment has declined to the rank of 30% share of import earnings has normal until 1962/63 East Pakistan's share of foreign account, and in recent years some 70% of West's foreign trade has shown a surplus that has absorbed virtually all foreign investment through foreign aid. Table 2 summarizes the investment in East Pakistan as a whole.

With respect to the third point, it is clear that the West has favoured West Pakistan. The West's foreign investments might have provided all of Pakistan's people. In fact,

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DOMINATION OF EAST AND WEST

The basic facts seem to support the East Pakistan charge of economic domination by the West. The economic disparities between East and West Pakistan have been so serious for so long that the East Pakistan government's highest planning authority has been forced to issue an official note of them.

A recent report⁵ by a panel of experts to The Planning Commission of the Government of Pakistan provides authoritative documentation of the widening of economic disparities in the two regions. The most striking fact in this report is the widening gap between the income of average West Pakistani and his Eastern counterpart. In 1959-60, per capita income in West Pakistan was 32% higher than in the East. In the next ten years the annual rate of growth of income of West Pakistan was 6.2% while it was only 4.2% in East Pakistan. As a result, by 1969-70 the per capita income of the West was 61% higher than in the East. Thus in ten years the income gap doubled in percentage terms; it increased even more in absolute terms.

East Pakistanis blame three instruments of central government policy for their plight:

Pakistan's scant investible resources, plus foreign aid, are directed unduly to the development of West Pakistan - to the comparative neglect of East Pakistan.

In particular, East Pakistan's foreign trade earnings are diverted to finance imports for West Pakistan.

Economic policy favours West Pakistan at the expense of the East. Specifically, tariffs, import controls, and industrial licensing compel East Pakistan to purchase commodities from West Pakistan cheaply, but for the controls, they could obtain more cheaply in world markets.

We believe the East Pakistani claims to be largely justified. First, it is indisputable that the bulk of development expenditure has gone in West Pakistan though the majority of the population lies in East. With 55% of the population, East Pakistan's share of total development expenditure (public and private) has increased from a low of 20% during the period 1950/51-1954/55 to a peak of 36% during the Third Five-Year Plan period 1965/66-1969/70. There has been a marked upward trend in East Pakistan's share of public development expenditure from a little over 25% in the period of 1950-1955 to 45% in the Third Five-Year Plan period (over 50% of expenditure the Indus replacement works is excluded). The share of East Pakistan in private investment, however, has been low during the entire period, and has amounted only to a little over 25% in recent years. The allocation of development expenditure is summarized in Table 1.

It may be true, as defenders of Pakistan government policy claim, that the great bulk of worthwhile investment opportunities have been in the West, though the relative attractiveness of the West may be due to the effect of overall government policy than a cause. In any event the fact remains that investments in the West have done little or nothing for the people in the East.

As for the second point, it is clear that foreign exchange has been allocated to the detriment of East Pakistan. Over the last two decades, East Pakistan's share of total export earnings has been as high as 70% and has declined to the range 45-55% in recent years, while the share of import earnings has normally been in the range of 29% to 33%. Until 1962/63 East Pakistan showed significant surpluses on the foreign account, and in recent years small deficits. By contrast,

of inefficient industries, which, ironically, have prospered largely because of tariffs and quotas that have made East Pakistan a captive market. In recent years, between 40% and 50% of all West Pakistan exports have been sold to East Pakistan. The data for the period 1949/50-1968/69 appear in Table 3.

An analysis of foreign trade data, coupled with the reasonable assumption that East Pakistan's fair share of foreign aid would have been a proportion equal to its proportion of Pakistan's population, indicates that a sizeable net transfer of resources has taken place from East to West Pakistan. According to the official report referred to above, if allowance is made for the under-valuation of foreign exchange in terms of Pakistan's domestic currency, the total transfer from East to West over the period 1948/49-1968/69 was Rs.31 billion. Using a scarcity value of Rs.11.90 to the dollar, this works out to \$2.6 billion.

In short, Pakistan's economic policies are harmful to East Pakistan. "Exploitation" may be a strong word, but it seems clear, all in all, that East Pakistan's economic interests have been subordinated to those of the West, and that the East Pakistanis have had good cause to resent that fact.

The economic domination of East Pakistan has been facilitated by West Pakistani dominance of the Central Government. The military regime in Pakistan has existed, with modifications, since 1958, and decision-making authority rests with a well-entrenched civil service and their military bosses. All senior military members of the administration have been West Pakistani, and of the senior officers, the Central civil services, 87% were West Pakistani in 1960, and the proportion has not changed much since. The deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and the Central Finance Minister, key individuals in resource allocation, have always been West Pakistanis.

The location of the Central Government in West Pakistan has encouraged the concentration of industry and the entrepreneurial class in West Pakistan. Such a concentration is to be expected in an economic system where direct allocational control of resources by the government makes direct access to government authorities a prime business asset.

TABLE 1
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE IN EAST AND WEST PAKISTAN
(in Millions of Rupees)

Period	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Total	Oftside Expenditure - Works Program	Total Development Expenditure - Works Program
	Development Expenditures	Total Public	Private	Indus Basin Works			
1950/51-1954/55	1,000	700	300	-	1,000	-	2,710
1955/56-1959/60	2,700	1,970	730	-	2,700	-	5,240
1960/61-1964/65	9,250	6,250	3,000	-	450	9,700	14,040
1965/66-1969/70	16,560	11,060	5,500	-	16,560	-	21,410

Note: Public sector development expenditure of the Provincial Govt. plus that of Central Govt. on projects located in the province, mainly based on Planning Commission estimates. Private development expenditure as estimated by Planning Committee.

Source: Report of Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Volume 1. Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 1971.

YEAR	FOREIGN IMPORTS			FOREIGN EXPORTS		
	E. Pakis- tan.	Paki- stan.	Percc. share of East Pakistan (1+2)	East Paki- stan.	Faki- stan.	Percentage share of East Pakistan (4+5)
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1948-49	282	1,459	19.3%	429	958	44.8%
1949-50	385	1,297	29.7%	629	1,194	52.7%
1950-51	453	1,620	28.0%	1,211	2,554	47.4%
1951-52	763	2,237	34.1%	1,087	2,009	54.1%
1952-53	366	1,384	26.4%	642	1,770	42.5%
1953-54	294	1,118	26.3%	645	1,286	50.2%
1954-55	320	1,103	29.0%	732	1,223	59.8%
1955-56	361	1,325	27.2%	1,041	1,784	58.4%
1956-57	819	2,235	36.7%	909	1,608	56.5%
1957-58	756	2,050	35.9%	988	1,422	69.5%
1958-59	554	1,578	35.1%	881	1,325	66.5%
1959-60	655	2,461	26.6%	1,030	1,843	55.9%

YEAR	WEST PAKISTAN'S REGIONAL AND FOREIGN EXPORTS			
	Exports to East Pakistan.	Exports Abroad	Total	Exports to East Pakistan as a percentage of West Pakistan's Total Exports (1+3)
	1	2	3	4
1949-50	229	565	794	28.8%
1950-51	211	1,342	1,553	13.6%
1951-52	161	922	1,083	14.9%
1952-53	117	867	984	11.9%
1953-54	370	641	971	38.1%
1954-55	293	491	784	37.4%
1955-56	319	742	1,061	30.1%
1956-57	510	698	1,226	29.5%
1957-58	690	434	1,124	61.4%
1958-59	660	444	1,104	59.8%
1959-60	543	763	1,306	42.3%

FOREIGN IMPORTS			FOREIGN EXPORTS		
Year	Pakistan	Percentage share of East Pakistan (1+2)	East Pakistan	Pakistan	Percentage share of East Pakistan (4+5)
2	3		4	5	6
1952	1,459	19.3%	429	958	44.8%
1953	1,297	29.7%	629	1,194	52.7%
1954	1,620	28.0%	1,211	2,554	47.4%
1955	2,237	34.1%	1,087	2,009	54.1%
1956	1,384	26.4%	642	1,500	42.5%
1957	1,118	26.3%	645	1,286	50.2%
1958	1,103	29.0%	732	1,223	59.8%
1959	1,325	27.2%	1,041	1,784	58.4%
1960	2,325	35.1%	909	1,608	56.5%
1961	2,050	35.9%	988	1,422	69.5%
1962	1,578	35.1%	881	1,325	66.5%
1963	2,461	26.6%	1,000	1,843	52.6%
1964	3,188	31.8%	1,259	1,799	70.0%
1965	3,109	28.1%	1,301	1,843	70.5%
1966	3,819	26.7%	1,249	2,247	55.6%
1967	4,430	33.6%	1,224	2,299	53.2%
1968	5,374	31.7%	1,268	2,408	52.7%
1969	4,208	31.6%	1,514	2,718	55.7%
1970	5,192	30.2%	1,575	2,913	54.1%
1971	4,655	29.5%	1,484	3,348	44.3%
1972	4,897	37.8%	1,543	3,305	46.7%
1973	5,098	35.6%	1,670	3,337	50.0%
1974	10,218	28.0%	5,375	10,734	50.1%
1975	9,749	32.1%	4,899	7,982	61.4%
1976	19,920	30.6%	6,301	10,596	59.5%
1977	24,050	32.8%	7,786	15,621	49.8%

YEAR	Exports to East Pakistan.	Exports Abroad	Total	Exports to East Pakistan as a percentage of West Pakistan's Total Exports (1+3)
	1	2	3	4
1949-50	229	565	794	28.8%
1950-51	211	1,342	1,553	13.6%
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1957-58	690	434	1,124	61.4%
1958-59	660	444	1,104	59.8%
1959-60	543	763	1,306	42.3%
1960-61	801	540	1,341	60.5%
1961-62	832	543	1,375	60.6%
1962-63	918	998	1,916	47.9%
1963-64	844	1,075	1,919	44.0%
1964-65	857	1,151	2,008	42.8%
1965-66	1,190	1,204	2,393	49.7%
1966-67	1,305	1,338	2,643	49.4%
1967-68	1,217	1,864	3,081	39.6%
1968-69	1,342	1,762	3,104	43.2%

Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues, Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

the December elections)

Assuming the independence movement succeeds while under the Awami League control, certain predictions may be made about its relations with its neighbours and super powers. As expressed in public statements of Mujib, an independent Bangla Desh will establish friendly relations with India and set up economic trade to their mutual advantage. Up to now such trade - and a cultural ties - have been frustrated by the West. Pakistanis who dominate the Central Government. They believe that, if of war, their only lever to force a settlement of their Kashmir claim is the economic interest of India in trade with East Pakistan. By contrast East Pakistan has never been aroused by Kashmir, and in the 1965 war military activity took place within its borders. Strong linguistic and cultural ties with the state of West Bengal in India are likely to cement durable good relations between the two countries and reduce the tension in the area. Unable to share the burden of military expenditures in East, West Pakistan is bound to tone down its policy of confrontation with India, a confrontation which for the past 24 years has diverted scarce resources of both these poor, populous countries from much needed economic development to defense.

As an independent nation Bangla Desh might conceivably establish marginal economic contacts with Communist China. But these are unlikely to be any greater than the current scale of trade and aid between China and Pakistan, and will certainly be less than the likely range and volume of East Bengal's economic ties to neighbouring India. As long as India is the main trading partner (and both pronouncements of Awami League leaders and the economic geography of the region support this possibility) it is unlikely that Bangla Desh will become a satellite of Communist China.

The U.S.S.R. has in the past three years become an active patron of the military clique that controls Pakistan. Soviet aid has included considerable economic aid (including agreements for a steel mill in Pakistan) and some military aid. The Soviet initiative has been largely a response to growing Communist Chinese ties with Pakistan. This competition between rival giants has rebounded to the benefit of West Pakistan where the central government and military establishment are. The U.S.S.R. has not been sensitive to aspirations of East Pakistan in the past, and is unlikely to make a new Bangla Desh an arena for super competition for influence.

A major goal of U.S. foreign policy in this area has been the reduction of the debilitating confrontation between India and Pakistan. This goal will surely be advanced by the existence of an independent Bangla Desh friendly to India. Most observers believe that the Awami League leadership will follow a neutral foreign policy, particularly the U.S. and multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank are the donors.

Bengali independence will be inimical to American interests only by following short-sighted policies we prize East Pakistan into the hands of another power - the U.S.S.R. or China. To the extent that Bengali independence is delayed by means of American arms, the image of the United States will suffer, and rightly so. The offer of arms to Pakistan by the United States Government in October 1970, whatever its ostensible purpose, will, if implemented, oil a Pakistani military machine that making war on its own citizens. The United States Government must this offer forthwith. No further military aid, or economic aid - will directly or indirectly provide foreign exchange that makes it possible to buy weapons abroad - should be given to West Pakistan until it withdraws its occupation force from East Bengal and recognizes the independence of the Bengali nation.

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Notes

1. Stern, J.J. and Falcon, W.P., Growth and Development in Pakistan 1955-69, Occasional Paper No.23, Harvard Center for International Affairs, April, 1970; W.A. Sattar, United States Aid and Pakistan's Economic Development, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation Tufts University, 1969.

(continued)

New York Times, September 28, 1964; Frank States and Pakistan, Orbis Vol. IX, Fall 1964; formal agreement signed May 1954, reported in press release, Department of State Bulletin, Washington Post, March 30; New York Times contain eyewitness accounts by correspondents of applied tanks.

Reports of the Advisory Panels for the 1970-75, Vol. 1, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 1970.

These were, in fact, two reports, one from Pakistani economists and one from a West Pakistani view; more reliable discussion of the West Pakistan panel agrees that the divergence between East and West Pakistan is increasing. They emphasize, however, that and particularly public, investment that Pakistan and express the hope and belief that this may correct the per capita income disparity. p.2, Table 1. As the report notes, the basic official data for the generally prevail in East compared to West.

ibid., p.6, Table 2.

Total foreign exchange available for imports, earnings and foreign aid. All data on official statistics issued by the Central Government of Pakistan.

Lewis, Stephen R., Pakistan: Industrialization, B.C.D., Oxford University Press, 1970.

The major conceptual difficulties inherent have been indicated: (1) A fair allocation benchmark; and (2) conversion of domestic the allocation of foreign aid according as reasonable; and the use of scarcity value official exchange rates for converting foreign goes, too. Report of the Advisory Panel presents the results in rupees terms. At the exchange rate Rs.11.90 = \$1.00 the average of the scarcity prices used by the of Appendix 3) plus a 10% margin to allow

Sahman, A., East and West Pakistan: A Comparative Economy of Regional Planning, Occasional Paper, University Center for International Affairs, among all Class 1 officers in the Central share was only 20 percent.

Bapanek, G.F., Pakistan's Development: A Comparative Analysis, Harvard University Press, 1969.

The Six Points are:

- 1) Establishment of a federation "on the basis of Resolution and the Parliamentary form of government and the supremacy of legislature directly elected by adult franchise"
- 2) Federal government shall deal with on defense and foreign affairs, and all other matters should rest in the federating states.

(continued)

New York Times, September 28, 1964; Frank N. Trager, "United States and Pakistan", Orbis Vol. IX, Fall 1965, No.3.

formal agreement signed May 1954, reported in Department of State press release, Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954; pp.85-851. Washington Post, March 30; New York Times, March 29 and March 30, contain eyewitness accounts by correspondents of use of U.S. supplied tanks.

Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, Vol. 1, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 1970.

These were, in fact, two reports, one from the panel of East Pakistani economists and one from a West Pakistani panel. The figures used in this document are drawn from the more detailed and, in our view, more reliable discussion of the East Pakistan Report. The West Pakistan panel agrees that the disparity in per capita income between East and West Pakistan is large and has been increasing. They emphasize, however, the growing share of total, and particularly public, investment that has been flowing to East Pakistan and express the hope and belief that in the course of time this may correct the per capita income disparity.

Ibid., p.2, Table 1. As the report notes these estimates of disparity are understatements because of a lack of adjustment in the basic official data for the generally higher prices which prevail in East compared to West.

Ibid., p.6, Table 2.

total foreign exchange available for imports is made up of export earnings and foreign aid. All data on trade are compiled from official statistics issued by the Central Statistical Office, Government of Pakistan.

Lewis, Stephen R., Pakistan; Industrialization and Trade Policies, O.E.C.D., Oxford University Press, 1970.

The major conceptual difficulties inherent in such a calculation have been indicated; (1) A fair allocation of foreign aid as a benchmark; and (2) conversion of domestic into foreign currencies. The allocation of foreign aid according to population appears to us reasonable, and the use of scarcity values rather than the official exchange rates for converting foreign exchange into rupees does, too. Report of the Advisory Panel, op.cit. Appendix 3 presents the results in rupees terms. Our conversion to dollars at the exchange rate Rs.11.90 = \$1.00 is based on a simple average of the scarcity prices used by the advisory Panel (Table 2 of Appendix 3) plus a 10% margin to allow for error.

Rahman, A., East and West Pakistan: A Problem in Political Economy of Regional Planning, Occasional Paper No.20, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1968. By 1966, among all Class I officers in the Central Government East Pakistan's share was only 20 percent.

Papanek, G.T., Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives, Harvard University Press, 1967.

The Six Points are:

1) Establishment of a federation "on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the Parliamentary framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of

Excerpts from Sheik Rahman

3) There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one currency for the whole country provided that effective constitutional provisions made to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. There should be separate banking reserves and a separate financial and monetary policy for East Pakistan.

4) Denial to the Central Government of the right of taxation; vesting of tax provisions in the hands of the federating states with the Central Government receiving a fixed share.

5) Foreign trade; Five steps shall be taken:

- a. There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings.
 - b. Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan and the same for West Pakistan.
 - c. Foreign exchange requirements of the federal government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed.
 - d. Indigenous products shall move free of duty within the wings.
 - e. The constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign countries.
- 6) Set up a militia or para military force by East Pakistan.
14. Preplanned according to reported by foreign correspondents, e.g. Sydney Schanberg in New York Times, March 26-29

15. The eyewitness account of a British correspondent in Washington Post March 30 leaves no doubt about the appropriateness of the word "massacre".

My dear fellow citizens, brothers

O Alauddin:

OUR STRUGGLE MUST GO ON. Freedom has to be won by the people. The exploited region by region must be brought to an end. Pakistan for 22 years, will have transferred power to the people. It is to frustrate the holding of the general election they will continue to obstruct every effort; they have influenced; they have the people. History, however, testifies successfully resist and overcome such

To overcome the crisis that those issues which are its cause. The freedom. The second is the sense of overwhelming multitudes of our people, injustice created by widening economic

OUR MANIFESTO sets out a clear these fundamental issues. A real living which all the fundamental freedoms that Our manifesto outlines a framework for parties, trade unions and local self-governments complete freedom of the press and academic corruption which has grown like cancer

The present economic system structure of injustice, must be radically

DISPARITIES. Today, barely control over 60 per cent of the nation of its banking assets and 75 per cent of the total bank advances are concentrated in the hands of a few. The tax structure is regressive in the world. Only 2 per cent direct taxes as against 6 per cent in oppressive indirect taxes are imposed

Despite nominal land reform estates. They enjoy vast privileges and the lot of the poorer peasants becomes

To turn to the appalling record seen that during the last 20 years, of the Government, only about Rs.1,500 of the total) was spent in Bengal, as West Pakistan. Of the total development Rs.3,000 crores (that is only one-third as against over Rs.6,000 crores in West

The record in the field of deplorable. After 21 years Bengal's central government services and less

OUR STRUGGLE MUST GO ON

Excerpts from Sheikh Rahman's Pre-election Speech.

My dear fellow citizens, brothers and sisters, Assalam

O Alaikum:

OUR STRUGGLE MUST GO ON. For the real goal lies ahead. Power has to be won by the people. The exploitation of man by man and of region by region must be brought to an end. The powerful coteries, which have ruled Pakistan for 22 years, will do everything possible to prevent transfer of power to the people. It is they who are actively conspiring to frustrate the holding of the general elections, and even after elections, they will continue to obstruct every effort to end exploitation. They have money; they have influence; they have the capacity to use force against the people. History, however, testifies that a determined people can successfully resist and overcome such forces of oppression.

To overcome the crisis that engulfs the nation, we must resolve those issues which are its cause. The first is the deprivation of political freedom. The second is the sense of economic injustice felt by the overwhelming multitudes of our people. The third is the deep sense of injustice created by widening economic disparity between the regions.

OUR MANIFESTO sets out a comprehensive strategy for resolving these fundamental issues. A real living democracy must be established in which all the fundamental freedoms shall be constitutionally guaranteed. Our manifesto outlines a framework for the healthy growth of political parties, trade unions and local self-government. We do pledge to restore complete freedom of the press and academic freedom and to eradicate corruption which has grown like cancer in our society.

The present economic system, which has established an intolerable structure of injustice, must be radically altered.

DISPARITIES. Today, barely two dozen families have acquired control over 60 per cent of the nation's industrial assets; 80 per cent of its banking assets and 75 per cent of its insurance assets; 82 per cent of the total bank advances are concentrated in only 3 per cent of the total accounts. The tax structure in existence is one of the most regressive in the world. Only 2 per cent of the GNP is being realized as direct taxes as against 6 per cent in other developing countries, while oppressive indirect taxes are imposed on such essential commodities as salt.

Despite nominal land reforms, feudal lords have retained princely estates. They enjoy vast privileges and their prosperity increases, while the lot of the poorer peasants becomes more and more desparate.

To turn to the appalling record of economic disparity, it is seen that during the last 20 years, out of the total revenue expenditure of the Government, only about Rs.1,500 crores (that is only one fifth of the total) was spent in Bengal, as against over Rs.5,000 crores in West Pakistan. Of the total development expenditure during the same period Rs.3,000 crores (that is only one-third of the total) was spent in Bengal, as against over Rs.6,000 crores in West Pakistan.

The record in the field of government services is just as deplorable. After 21 years Bengalis account for barely 15 per cent in

The total economic impact of such discrimination has been that the economy of Bengal is today in a state of imminent collapse. Near famine conditions are prevailing in the majority of the villages. Some 15 lac tons of rice has had to be imported only to save people from starvation.

While inflation has been mounting, those who are worse hit are the poor people of Bengal. The price of essential commodities has been 5 per cent to 1 per cent higher in Bengal than in West Pakistan.

This injustice is the product of the management of the economy for 22 years by the Central Government. The Central Government is incapable of redressing such injustices.

THE AWAMI LEAGUE'S SIX POINT PROGRAMME, which is embodied in the 11-point programme, presents a rational solution to this problem of regional injustice. With a central bureaucracy in which Bengalis account for barely 15 per cent and with the nature of the power structure being what it is, to expect justice from a centralised system of economic management would be to expect the impossible. Attempts to secure larger allocations by political representatives of Bengal and other under developed areas would only aggravate regional tensions and threaten the viability of the Federal Government. The only feasible solution is the re-ordering of the constitutional structure by giving full regional autonomy to the federating units on the basis of our Six Point formula. Such autonomy to the federating units in order to be effective must include the power of managing the economy. This is why we insist upon federating units having control over monetary and fiscal policy and foreign exchange earnings and other powers to negotiate foreign trade and aid. By giving to the federating units full control over its economic destiny, while entrusting to the Federal Government responsibility over foreign affairs and defence and subject to certain safeguards, currency, we believe a just federal balance will be attained.

OUR FEDERAL SCHEME envisages the abolition of all Pakistan services and its replacement by federal services in which persons shall be recruited on the basis of population for all parts of Pakistan.

We believe that it is imperative to place key areas of the economy, including banking and insurance, under public ownership through nationalisation. Future development in these areas should take place in the public sector. In the new order, workers should share in the equi capital and management of industrial enterprises.

THE PRIVATE SECTOR also, in its own sphere, must make their full contribution to the economy. Monopolies and cartels must be totally eliminated. The tax structure must be made truly progressive and drastic restrictions must be imposed on the consumption of luxuries.

SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES must be developed through co-operative and dispersed throughout the countryside, reaching into the depths of the rural areas, so that desperately needed employment opportunities are extended to our rural masses.

Indeed our entire AGRICULTURAL SECTOR needs to be revolutionized..... and modernised. The Jagirdari, Zamindari and Sardari systems in West Pakistan must be abolished. The entire land system has to undergo radical reorientation in the interest of the actual tillers of land. Ceilings must be imposed on land holdings. Land above such ceilings and government Khas lands must be re-distributed to landless cultivators.

THREE VITAL AREAS which form the economy must be accorded the highest control. A comprehensive flood control on an emergency basis. Measures to prevent West Pakistan must also be implemented.

The next vital area is that expansion in power generation and distribution.

An extensive rural electrification to take electricity to the villages, so scale industries to be established. The and Jamalganj Coal Project must be implemented also be fully utilised.

The third vital area is that The development of ports, roads and railways must be accelerated.

EDUCATION. It is an alarming fact that population in Bengal has declined since 1947 and that literacy and the population has attained literacy and that increasing by over one million person per annum. 4 per cent of the Gross National Product must be eradicated by adopting literacy.

A crash programme must be launched for primary education to all children within the country should be made readily accessible to all.

Turning to the PROBLEM OF THE GROUPS living in sub-human conditions, concentrated on providing for the needs of the dwellers. Low cost urban housing must be provided.

In the field of HEALTH even is denied to over 90 per cent of our population should be undertaken to establish a rural and a hospital at every thana headquarters.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS play a vital role in the economy. Their basic rights to form trade unions to bargain must be guaranteed.

The wage structure in all sectors should be altered in keeping with the dictates of the market. Measures must be adopted to protect the interests of low paid employees against spiralling inflation.

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE IN THE EQUITY of the minority community should know that every form of communalism. They shall be citizens and shall enjoy equal protection of the law. It should be made to develop our tribal areas so that they be integrated with other areas and the tribal areas be integrated with other citizens in all spheres.

I must repudiate once and for all the Islam is endangered by the Six Point formula. Nothing which promotes justice between Muslims and non-Muslims can be opposed to Islam.

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THREE VITAL AREAS which form part of the infrastructure of the economy must be accorded the highest priority. The first is flood control. A comprehensive flood control programme must be implemented on an emergency basis. Measures to prevent water-logging and salinity in West Pakistan must also be implemented at an accelerated pace.

The next vital area is that of power. There must be massive expansion in power generation and distribution.

An extensive rural electrification programme must be launched to take electricity to the villages, so as to make it possible for small scale industries to be established. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Project and Jamalganj Coal Project must be immediately implemented. Natural gas must also be fully utilised.

The third vital area is that of transport and communications.

The development of ports, both seaports and inland river ports, as also roads and railways must be accorded the highest priority.

EDUCATION. It is an alarming fact that the number of primary schools in Bengal has declined since 1947. Only 18 per cent of our population has attained literacy and the number of illiterates is increasing by over one million person per year. We believe that at least 4 per cent of the Gross National Product should be committed to education. Illiteracy must be eradicated by adoption of extraordinary methods.

A crash programme must be launched to extend free compulsory primary education to all children within 5 years. Secondary education should be made readily accessible to all sections of our people.

Turning to the PROBLEM OF THE CITIES, we find low income groups living in sub-human conditions. Future urban development must concentrate on providing for the needs of the poor majority of city dwellers. Low cost urban housing must be accorded the highest priority.

In the field of HEALTH even a minimum measure of medical relief is denied to over 90 per cent of our population. Immediate measures should be undertaken to establish a rural medical centre at every union, and a hospital at every thana headquarters.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS play a vital role in the economy. Their basic rights to form trade unions to bargain collectively and to strike must be guaranteed.

The wage structure in all sectors of the economy must be altered in keeping with the dictates of justice. Price stabilisation measures must be adopted to protect the real wages of the workers and low paid employees against spiralling inflation.

WE FIRMLY BELIEVE IN THE EQUALITY OF ALL CITIZENS. The members of the minority community should know that we have always stood against every form of communalism. They shall enjoy equal rights with all other citizens and shall enjoy equal protection of the laws. Every effort must be made to develop our tribal areas so that these areas can be fully integrated with other areas and the tribal people are able to enjoy equal opportunities with other citizens in all walks of life.

I must repudiate once and for all the false propaganda that Islam is endangered by the Six Point formula of our economic programme. Nothing which promotes justice between nation and nation and man and man

On September 1, the Parisian daily interview recorded by its special correspondent in Pakistan's President Yahya Khan. We take Pierre Bois' long introduction.

I have followed the cycle of Hell: distress inspecting the Indian "refugee" absurdity wandering the empty streets but above all, I have met the man accused his bloody spectacle, the exclusive interlocuting frankness.

Certain people say of Yahya Khan that liberal who wanted to apply democracy there still, a fighter for the Faith who not fomented by the Awami League with I He is not, in any case, a new Genghis himself replies simply, "I am just a

Karachi, August:

The government car is not luxurious city streets of Karachi. It turns near oasias of luxury and air-conditioning, in front of a guardpost. We wait two the heat, and we set off again, passing armed soldiers, along the red sandy F aggressive green of the English lawns.

The residence of the former British Aga Khan has established his temporary What strikes the visitor first of quality, of the decor. It is more a brance of an Oriental potonate. The ar of fusion of carpets and furniture; the office of the Chief of State is ornaments anywhere. Just a sofa, two aya is sitting in one of the armchairs retains the bearing of a military white streak, and enormous eyebrows.

Now and then breaks into laughter wh secretary. The conversation begins will pouring mouthfuls of cucumber sandwich

Q: I'm told that you're going back set trip ended up rather badly. What is A: I am going back, but not now, only one of my five provinces.

Q: But why would you go to Dacca?

A: What? Who can forbid me goir country?

Q: That wasn't what I meant. What did you there now?

A: There are heaps of problems ov inger. We cannot transport the food.

erves, and the railway line that leav taken by Indian mortar fire (1) We cou ve very beautiful rivers, but not enou omised us some, but only the Chinese K

Q: You still believe then, that a ocide, a union is still possible betw

A: The fact that you use the word t know Pakistan. And then, I can t story of Pakistan. The first ones t created were precisely the East Pakis

ident about the future; Bengal will at you have failed. Before, you were tical ambitions other than to give P situation. But hardly had the peopl sent the army in.

A: That is Mujibur Rahman's fault as perhaps a fine talker, but he hadd as brilliant and very sure of himsel as nothing more than a how shalli as nothing more than that (3) (Genera

To turn to the important area of FOREIGN POLICY, we believe that it is imperative for us to avoid involvement in global power co We must, therefore, pursue a truly independent non-aligned foreign po We are committed to the immediate withdrawal from SEATO, CENTO and al other military pacts, and to avoid any such involvements in the futur We support the struggle of the oppressed people of the world against imperialism, colonialism and apartheid. In keeping with the principl 'friendship for all and malice towards none', we believe in peaceful co-existence with all States and in particular with our neighbours.

REPRESENTATION. But these programmes and policies can onl be implemented if power is won by the people. Elections will serve a referendum on basic national issues, particularly that of autonomy the basis of the Six Point formula.

The elected representatives of the people alone can give country a constitution which will be a durable basis for living toget It is for this reason that we have repeatedly pointed out that resti sought to be imposed on the constitution-making powers of the electe representatives of the people are not legitimate.

WE SHALL FACE THE CHALLENGE. It is imperative for the security of the nation that our armed forces should not have to carr the burden of civil administration or to have to involve itself in p These highly trained professionals should be left free to devote the exclusively to the vital task of defending the nation's frontiers.

I would like to end by saying that as a nation we must pr equal to the challenge that faces us. A real living democracy must be established. The different people who make up Pakistan can only liv together within a democratic framework.

Any attempt to destroy democracy would in the process destr Pakistan. Justice between region and region must be ensured by gran full regional autonomy to the federating units on the basis of our Six Point formula. Within such a federal democratic framework, radical economic programmes must be implemented to bring about a social revol

The Awami League has resolved to face this great challenge We believe that with the support and confidence of the people, which party enjoys, we shall, Inshaallah, be able successfully to meet the challenge.

Pakistan Zinhabad.

INTERVIEW WITH YAHYA KHAN

On September 1, the Parisian daily Le Figaro published an interview recorded by its special correspondent Pierre Bois with Yahya Khan, Pakistan's President. We take up the interview at the close of Pierre Bois' long introduction.

I have followed the cycle of Hell: travelling to the extremity of the country, inspecting the Indian "refugee camps", travelling to the depth of the Punjab, inspecting the empty streets of Dacca in East Pakistan. Above all, I have met the man accused of being the main actor in the bloody spectacle, the exclusive interview he granted me is of a most interesting frankness.

Certain people say of Yahya Khan that he is an executioner. Others say he is a man who wanted to apply democracy too early to a medieval land. He is still, a fighter for the Faith who had to smother in blood a movement fomented by the Awami League with India's complicity.

He is not, in any case, a new Genghis Khan. Then what is he? He himself replies simply, "I am just a soldier". You may judge....

Karachi, August:

The government car is not luxurious. It goes bumping along the streets of Karachi. It turns near the Hotel Intercontinental, the oasis of luxury and air-conditioning, and stops a quarter-mile further in front of a guardpost. We wait two or three minutes suffocating in the heat, and we set off again, passing officers with stick in hand armed soldiers, along the red sandy paths which clash with the too-peaceful green of the English lawns. We have reached the interior of the residence of the former British Governor, which is where General Yahya Khan has established his temporary headquarters.

What strikes the visitor first of all is the modesty, the simplicity, of the decor. It is more a barracks than the sumptuous palace of an Oriental potentate. The entrance hall lacks the usual confusion of carpets and furniture; there are very few servants.

The office of the Chief of State is painted green. No pictures, no ornaments anywhere. Just a sofa, two armchairs, a fan. General Yahya is sitting in one of the armchairs. He is in civilian clothes, white retains the bearing of a military man. He has greying hair with a white streak, and enormous eyebrows. He replies without hesitation, and now and then breaks into laughter which he shares with his private secretary. The conversation begins while we are drinking tea and pouring mouthfuls of cucumber sandwiches.

Q: I'm told that you're going back to East Pakistan soon. Your last trip ended up rather badly. What is your plan in going back there?

A: I am going back, but not now, I'm too busy, and East Pakistan is only one of my five provinces.

Q: But why would you go to Dacca?

A: What? Who can forbid me going wherever I want to in my country?

Q: That wasn't what I meant. What is it, precisely, that could keep you there now?

A: There are heaps of problems over there. To begin with, we cannot transport the food. We have only three months' reserves, and the railway line that leaves from Chittagong has been broken by Indian mortar fire (1) We could go along the waterways: we have very beautiful rivers, but not enough boats. Foreign countries promised us some, but only the Chinese have kept their promise.

Q: You still believe then, that after your army's policy of genocide, a union is still possible between East and West Pakistan?

A: The fact that you use the word 'genocide' shows that you don't know Pakistan. And then, I can tell you something about the history of Pakistan. The first ones to have asked for the State to be created were precisely the East Pakistanis (2). So I am very confident about the future; Bengal will remain Pakistani.

Q: And yet, one of the reasons for the crisis in Bengal was that you have frittered away...

armchair and takes a teaspoon. He says in a confidential tone) - I'm going to tell you a story - During the discussions at Dacca, when the fate of the nation was at stake. I forced myself to be patient. Mujib put on an unconcerned air, while playing with his pipe. But I had only to raise my voice for you to hear his teeth chattering. Then, do you know what he did?

(General Yahya lets out an enormous burst of laughter and grips the teaspoon with all his might between his teeth) He must have broken quite a few pipes during the discussions.

(The laughter stops and the Pakistani President continues more seriously:)

To govern a country, you must have good sense. Myself, I am a soldier, I was not brought up to govern. I trust to my good sense. Mujibur Rahman was a little fascist who had no sense of moderation. The people elected him on a programme of autonomy. Intoxicated, he soon talked of independence (4). In the beginning, the autonomy he proposed had six points, - autonomy in the classic style of a federation that is to say, leaving a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finance Ministry (5), and Ministry of Defence. I was agreeable to that. Then, hardly was he elected when I noticed that he was already making alterations:

1. For example, he demanded total freedom of trade for East Pakistan. That means, in other words, the resumption of trade with India (6).

2. Defence. There, he wanted to create a paramilitary force.

3. Finance. He wanted two currencies - East Pakistan and West Pakistan - and two Reserve Banks (7). Finally, a separate flag. What did that mean after all? That meant secession.

Q: Before sending the army in, you had ten days of talks with Mujibur Rahman at Dacca. What happened then?

A: On one hand, Mujibur Rahman had a majority of votes in East Pakistan; on the other, Bhutto had been successful in West Pakistan. It was the first election with a general franchise (8). I wanted the elected members from these two important parties to create a constitution to substitute civil power for military power. But with Mujibur, all discussion was impossible. A dialogue of the deaf. It escalated very quickly, Mujibur said to me, "Put an end to martial law"; I replied, "It will be the National Assembly which does that when there is a constitution". He said, "Transfer power before the National Assembly meets". I replied, "To whom? You are only one party, and there are three others in the West". He said, "Withdraw the twenty thousand men in your army" (9). I said, "Where will I put them? They are here in Pakistan".

Q: Mujibur Rahman was elected by the people. If you believe in democracy, why didn't you let him do as he wanted to?

A: First of all, I repeat to you that he was not elected on a programme of independence. The people voted for "autonomy". Besides, Bengal is only one of the five provinces of Pakistan. What does a nation become if each one rifles with independence (10-)

Q: How is it that, from autonomy, Mujibur Rahman arrived at independence.

A: He didn't change his mind all by himself. You know, the Indians (11). They have never accepted partition, and have never lost a chance to weaken our position.

Q: There has been talk too of the CIA's activities? A: There has been talk, it is true, of the CIA, and the English. The Chinese have even openly accused all the Western countries. I have no proof of that. On the other hand, it is certain that the Indians have been supplying the Awami League with money and arms. As for the others, I certainly have suspicions, but when one governs, one can't daily with suspicions.

Q: What happened in your last interview with Mujibur Rahman?

A: Mujibur said to me, "If you don't sign an agreement with me, there will be a revolt in East Pakistan tomorrow". I looked at him and said "Very well! Go ahead with it, your revolt!"

(President Yahya sighs. He says:) I was really grieved... for him?

Q: But you talk of him in the past? What has become of him?

A: He is in prison.

Q: Where?

A: I don't know. In France, does your President know where all the criminals are? And if he is capable of knowing, it's because your country you don't have many of them! (***) SEE NOTES **

Q: On the tragic night of March 25, your army is said to have committed a massacre. They have forgotten to talk about the Awami League?

ready on March 2, at Chittagong, the Awami League martyrs, Punjabis... and others, bled them to death. I of the events, read the White Paper my government

Q: But your army.

A: My army is a professional, well-trained Indian Army. When my soldiers kill, they kill clean.

Q: You've denied that there have been 250,000 deaths at Dacca wasn't a football game. When one

Q: You sent away the journalists - why?

A: I wanted to protect them. When you begin

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Q: What is the situation in East Pakistan

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on March 2, at Chittagong, the Awami League took hold of the non-Bengalis, Punjabis... and others, bid them to march. It was a massacre. That was only the events, read the White Paper my Government has prepared on the matter (12).

Q: But your army.
A: My army is a professional, well-trained army. I myself was formed in an Army. When my soldiers kill, they kill cleanly.

Q: You've denied that there have been 250,000 dead.
A: That is very exaggerated, but certainly there have been some dead. What at Dacca wasn't a football game. When one fights, one doesn't throw flowers.

Q: You sent away the journalists - why?
A: I wanted to protect them. When you begin a military action of that kind, you don't know how it's going to end up. I acted as a soldier, not as an politician. In the end, I regret it. If some journalists had been killed by the League, it would have been very useful to me. Then they would have talked atrocities of the Awami League.

Q: What is the situation in East Pakistan now?
A: As regards law and order, everything is now under the control of law, except for certain border zones. And I can tell you that I am still firmly determined to transfer the reins of government to the people.

I have banned the Awami League, but I have not abolished the seats of elected members of the province (13). I have got rid of the traitors, and I have 99 members who can sit in the National Assembly. For the rest, I will stage elections. And even the border troubles will not prevent me going on with the de-escalation process to the end. The only condition is that I am left alone.

Q: What is the present situation along the borders?
A: Go and see. It is not a bit peaceful. Because India continues to infiltrate troops and encourage the revolt. It's because of that that the refugees cannot move. One can accept this within normal limits, but the situation cannot last. In normal times, what happens along the border would signify war. When try and 25-lb. bombs across the border of another country? That's what we're getting. Well, I am observing this with great patience, but it would do me well to warn you that if the Indians imagine that they can take a parcel of my territory and provoke war, they are committing a grave error. Let me warn you and warn you that that will mean war, total war, which I hate. But for the defence of my country, I would not hesitate.

Q: And the refugee problem?

A: The refugee problem, let's talk about it. India is using the refugees as political capital, and simply as capital. She is drawing the UN money from it. There are ways of aiding the refugees. India has asked for money alone (14). She is wanting them from returning. She says they will not return until an agreement is signed. But with whom? The refugee problem is not India's problem, it is ours. Besides, how many are there, these refugees? According to India, seven million. According to us, two million. And I am going to tell you how you get from seven. There are in and around Calcutta thousands of Hindus who settled down at the time of Partition. You know, over there human beings live around 1000. They have mixed true and false refugees in the camps. But don't you worry: when the refugees return, we will take a count, and we will know quite well to pick out the good from the bad...

Q: In this affair, have you also made a count of your foreign enemies and friends?

A: I certainly have, and that's more, on this occasion I have really seen English show themselves at the head of the opposition. That, it's true, has not been a surprise. As for France, I profit by your presence to thank her. Your President, I am sure, has written me a letter in which he showed, certainly, his concern for the refugee situation, but on the other hand he explained to me that he didn't want to interfere in an internal matter. As for the Chinese, their friendly attitude is well-known.

Q: To settle the border conflict, do you intend entering into discussions with India?

A: On more than one occasion, I have declared that I am ready to discuss India, but I have had no response. (President Yahya gets up. The interview is over. He accompanies me back to the entrance hall. He is smiling. I ask him:)

- But if you met Mrs Indira Gandhi, what would you say to her?
He bursts into laughter one last time, and replies:
- She doesn't like my face. But that doesn't worry me.

INTERVIEW WITH YAHYA KHAN) NOTES

1. The Bangladesh Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) has generally been given credit for this, and many other successful acts of sabotage.
2. This distorts history completely. Until about a year before Independence came in 1947, Bengali Muslims were ambivalent about joining Pakistan.
3. Compare Bhutto, during a BBC interview in April: "The Sheikh had many qualities of leadership, and he was undoubtedly a talented person and had rendered great contributions in the past."
4. Until the hour when the Army launched its attack on March 25, Mujib held fast to the programme of autonomy, resisting strong pressures from more radical Bengalis to declare independence. He made it clear, however, that if the regime refused to allow the autonomy the voters demanded, Bengalis would turn to armed struggle for total independence as has happened.
5. Actually, a Ministry to co-ordinate currency and banking, with no powers of taxation.
6. This point, and the two that follow, were not in any way altered. They were part of the six-point programme from the beginning, when it was set out in Sheikh Mujib's pamphlet, Our Right to Live (1966). It is inconceivable that Yahya Khan could have been unaware of this.
7. Mujib's programme called for two currencies of two Reserve Banks, not both.
8. It might be mentioned that the ruling elite, composed of the Army, the Bureaucracy, monopoly capitalists, and Punjabi landlords in the main, was confident that conservative and Muslim fanatic parties would win the elections easily. Had it suspected that Mujib and Bhutto would win 167 and 86 respectively of the 313 seats, it is doubtful the fair elections would have been held. Further, these were not the first elections with a general franchise in the East, in 1954 the establishment's Muslim League provincial government was opposed by a United Front, led by the Awami League, and running on a platform of regional autonomy and radical social reform very similar to Mujib's last December. The Front won 223 out of 237 Muslim seats, and its allies swept the non-Muslim seats. It then formed a government which the West-based Central Government dismissed before the Parliament could meet.
9. Correspondents in Dacca were generally agreed that the Army had 70,000 men in the East by March 25.
10. This is the standard argument put up by opponents of Bangla Desh. It ignores the quite unique geographical separation of the other four provinces from East Bengal - separation by a thousand miles of Indian territory. This separateness is reinforced by the alien languages, history, social structures, terrain, climates, cultures, economic standards and opportunities - and most importantly, the fact that the two wings are settled by different races, and the savagery of the Army massacres can only be understood by grasping the racial chauvinist beliefs applied by non-Bengalis against Bengalis. The argument also ignores the fact that the 'secessionist' wing contains the majority of the population.
11. Pakistanis regard India as Evil in the form of a nation, and to a lesser degree, the sentiment is returned. The Pakistani people are now being told it is Indians (plus a handful of 'miscreants') who are fighting their Army in Bangladesh. Presumably one of India's recent attempts to destroy Pakistan was its gift of \$1,200,000 after the tragic cyclone in the East last November.
12. Foreign correspondents in Dacca during March 1-25 were unanimous in reporting that the Awami League provided a genuine and effective peace-keeping force during that period the responsibility for the killings there were before the Army began its attack were attributed by foreign correspondents to the Army firing on unarmed demonstrators.
13. Yahya Khan has abolished the seats of 257 of the Awami League's 455 internal and provincial assembly members. These are the 'traitor' By-elections have been announced for their seats, while of the other 178, only 20-30 have declared themselves to the Army.
14. Almost all the aid India has received so far for the refugees has been in actual goods, not cash.

**

Q: But all the same, he is your principal enemy...
A: He is not my principal enemy, he is the enemy of the people of Pakistan. Don't worry, everyone in Pakistan knows where he is, but it's useless to ask them, they won't tell you.
Q: I'm interested in your opinion?
A: I'm sick of justifying myself. I said he was alive, take my word on

THE CASE FOR BANGLA DESH
By Debesh Bhattacharya

Since independence in 1947, the attitude towards East Bengal has been contempt. For instance, Urdu alone was the official language of the official Pakistan State. The Census of 1951 showed or 3.3 per cent of the population spoke Urdu or 3.3 per cent could speak Urdu at all. The minority language official are also economic have limited access to jobs in the administration.

Discrimination in jobs against East Bengalis five per cent of civil servants and ninety per cent of West Pakistan, although it accounts for 125 million population.

In terms of the allocation of investible resources went to West Pakistan and third Pakistan received only twenty per cent of period. The transfer of real resources for independence has been estimated at \$US6,400 million (quoted in Tariq Ali Officer of Pakistan).

The depth of this contempt is illustrated by the West Pakistan Government's helicopters to lend to Ceylon for its actions during the massive natural disaster in East Pakistan only one helicopter.

Bengalis have been aware of many of the of misery and they have refused to be ruled by their loyalty to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in by a 98.4 per cent vote for the Awami League showed that he and the Awami League were authority there. The response of the non-co-operation with West Pakistanis was the common binding factor between the West the East Bengalis indicated that they were their demand for autonomy had been opposed businessmen and the top bureaucrats and years, the Army emerged as the chief defectors this year showed that it is impossible artificial Pakistan.

It should be remembered that Mujib had had hope of establishing a feasible confederation for Bengal Desh. The responsibility for Since then he may have lost his effective instrument of the military-bureaucratic Yahya was merely play-acting when he pro Dacca until March 25. In fact, he was Bengal from West Pakistan.

THE CASE FOR BANGLA DESH

By Debesh Bhattacharya

Since independence in 1947, the attitude of the leaders of West Pakistan towards East Bengal has been contempt. For fourteen years, until 1961, for instance, Urdu alone was the official language of both parts of the Pakistan State. The Census of 1951 showed that only 2.5 million people or 3.3 per cent of the population spoke Urdu as a mother tongue and only 7.3 per cent could speak Urdu at all. The implications of declaring a minority language official are also economic: Those who cannot speak it have limited access to jobs in the administration.

Discrimination in jobs against East Bengalis has been persistent. Eighty-five per cent of civil servants and ninety per cent of Army Officers have come from West Pakistan, although it accounts for only forty-four per cent of the country's 125 million population.

In terms of the allocation of investible resources, the difference is equally sharp. Over the past twenty-five years, seventy per cent of the resources went to West Pakistan and thirty per cent to the East. East Pakistan received only twenty per cent of total Foreign Aid over the same period. The transfer of real resources from East to West Pakistan since independence has been estimated at \$US5,000 by Mr. Huk, the Chief Statistical Officer of Pakistan (quoted in Tariq Ali: "Military Rule or People's War").

The depth of this contempt is illustrated by a recent event reported in the newspapers. The West Pakistan Government was able to find two helicopters to lend to Ceylon for its action against a rebellion. But during the massive natural disaster in East Bengal last year it could spare only one helicopter.

Bengalis have been aware of many of the details of a quarter of a century of misery and they have refused to be ruled in the old way. They indicated their loyalty to Sheik Mujibur Rehman in the democratic election of 1970 by a 98.4 per cent vote for the Awami League leaders. Sheik Mujibur Rehman showed that he and the Awami League were the only legitimate source of authority there. The response of the masses to his policy of non-violent non-co-operation with West Pakistanis was spectacular.

The common binding factor between the West and the East was religion. But the East Bengalis indicated that they were Bengalis first and then Moslems. Their demand for autonomy had been opposed all along by West Pakistani businessmen and the top bureaucrats and military. Over the past twelve years, the Army emerged as the chief defender of these interests. Its actions this year showed that it is imposing unity and loyalty on an artificial Pakistan.

It should be remembered that Mujib had been remarkably moderate, in the hope of establishing a feasible confederation. It was only after the breakdown of his talks with President Yahya that he called for independence for Bangla Desh. The responsibility for the breakdown rests with Yahya. Since then he may have lost his effective authority and have become an instrument of the military-bureaucratic establishment. Retrospectively, Yahya was merely play-acting when he prolonged discussions with Mujib in Dacca until March 25. In fact, he was waiting for troops to arrive in Bengal from West Pakistan.

Pakistani forces made a land, air and water attack on the poorly organized people of East Bengal. They killed students, intellectuals, and Hindus. Victims of the military operation included Awami League Members, students and professors and their families, women and children shot in their houses and Bengalis of the Hindu religion taken out and shot en-masse. According to Thayil Jacob George of Intrasia News Service a Pakistani Air Force officer, confronted by a British woman evacuee who had protested about the slaughter of children declared: "If we leave the children to be orphans, they will grow up to be anti-West Pakistan. So it is better to kill them." Nobody knows the total kill. Some reports put it as high as a million.

Events in East Pakistan should be the concern of the international community and must not be treated as "internal affairs of Pakistan". The Pakistani Army's slaughter of democratically elected leaders of Awami League and repression of the majority of its population in the interests of West Pakistan supremacy is surely not "an internal matter". People residing in East Bengal and India are frequently related and it is but natural for Indians (especially Bengalis of West Bengal) to have their sympathies with the people of East Bengal. Hence, India is under pressure not to remain a silent spectator. Since there is a possibility that India might get involved, the developments in East Bengal are a threat to international peace.

The United States, Britain, Russia, China, Australia and every country which gives aid to Pakistan can stop the sufferings of the people of East Bengal by cutting off military and economic aid. Pakistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid for its development. West Pakistani troops would not be withdrawn as long as foreign aid from abroad continues.

The super powers do not really care about the sufferings. Russia or America will not support the independence movement in East Bengal because that may help China to increase her influence over West Pakistan. On the other hand, China tacitly supports the military rulers of West Pakistan because they provide the balance against Soviet influence in India. China has found this arrangement of sufficient practical value to continue the militarist crushing of a popular, progressive liberation. Chinese-made tanks and weapons were used in the streets of Dacca by Pakistani troops and those troops were flown in by courtesy of China's airspace. Recent events in Pakistan and Ceylon suggest that China is no longer a patron of liberation movements even though they are led by the Maoists.

It is difficult to predict what exactly would be the course of future events in East Bengal. But one thing is very clear; democracy is dead in Pakistan. The landslide victory by Mujib in East Bengal had compelled President Yahya to call a halt to the exercise in democracy. He has repudiated the result of a democratic election. Military rule in West Pakistan is likely to stay.

In the short run, the Pakistani Army will win and after a blood bath, East Pakistan will become an occupied territory, with Mujib in prison and the Awami League banned and the economic and political domination of the West Pakistan re-established. But the Army will face a situation where independence has become a burning passion for literally every man, woman and child of the seventy-five million Bengalis. Can they be kept permanently under control by military force? The National Awami Party under Maulana Bhasani (who used to be pro-Peking) has declared that it is preparing for guerrilla war; would it offer a promising alternative for bringing independence for the people of East Bengal?

If a guerrilla campaign gets under way, leadership for two reasons. First, the prepared for armed resistance; they are better equipped to fight in Parliament feelings of solidarity with fellow Bengali exploited by the Marxists parties of West Bengal, the disciplined command from West Bengal, the disciplined command the direction of a guerrilla movement.

With the coming of the monsoons, some likely. During this period, the National forces of East Bengal may try to co-ordinate small liberation army groups are planned assassinations and sabotage. The independence would be able to buy and receive weapons from Burma borders to arm the population with mobile units of the liberation force to control much of the countryside and would between city and country. Since the logistical problems in supporting its troops in the East and since the militant liberation to arm the peasants and the masses, they take cities and even win a conventional war.

Unless independence is granted to Bengal since the superpowers are not willing to must intervene if this bloodbath is to

One can understand why India is not too keen in the United Nations. The Indian army militants in East Bengal will join session of West Bengal from India. National West Bengal have dreamt about the possibility of Bengal. Moreover, an independent Bengal full socialist movement which might link Bengal and with the ethnic revolts in

If the superpowers stop all foreign aid Nations act quickly, an unnecessary blood United Nations can ask its member nations fuel, military spare parts and equipment reconciled to this once the big powers occupation of East Bengal.

If a guerrilla campaign gets under way, it will come under more militant leadership for two reasons. First, the Awami League leaders were not prepared for armed resistance; they are mostly middle-class bourgeois, better equipped to fight in Parliament than in a guerrilla war. Secondly, feelings of solidarity with fellow Bengalis in East Pakistan would be exploited by the Marxists parties of West Bengal. Backed by Marxists from West Bengal, the disciplined communists are likely to take over the direction of a guerrilla movement.

With the coming of the monsoons, some lull on the battlefronts is likely. During this period, the National Awami Party and other militant forces of East Bengal may try to co-ordinate their activities. Already small liberation army groups are planning to harass the military by assassination and sabotage. The independence movement of East Bengal would be able to buy and receive weapons from across the Indian or Burmese borders to arm the population which is now unarmed. Larger, mobile units of the liberation force thus established would be able to control much of the countryside and would produce a military stalemate between city and country. Since the army of West Pakistan would face logistics problems in supporting its troops against the hostile population in the East and since the militant liberation forces have already tried to arm the peasants and the masses, the liberation force may eventually take cities and even win a conventional victory.

Unless independence is granted to Bangla Desh, there will be a bloodbath. Since the superpowers are not willing to get involved, the United Nations must intervene if this bloodbath is to be avoided.

One can understand why India is not too enthusiastic about raising Bangla Desh in the United Nations. The Indian Government fears that revolutionary army militants in East Bengal will join Indian communists favouring the secession of West Bengal from India. Many Bengalis from both the East and West Bengal have dreamt about the possibility of an Independent Republic of Bengal. Moreover, an independent Bangla Desh might throw up a powerful socialist movement which might link up with the movements in West Bengal and with the ethnic revolts in Nagaland and the Mizo Hills.

If the superpowers stop all foreign aid to West Pakistan and the United Nations act quickly, an unnecessary bloodbath could be avoided. The United Nations can ask its member nations to stop the sale of ammunition fuel, military spare parts and equipment. West Pakistan will become reconciled to this once the big powers refuse to subsidise the continuing occupation of East Bengal.

SEVEN REASONS FOR SUPPORTING BANGLA DESH

The gruesome terrorism which the West Pakistani Army has been practising against the mass of the East Pakistan population since March is now fairly well known.

According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of those who have fled East Pakistan for India has reached ten million. Neither we believe the number of Bengalis killed so far to be 50,000 or 2 million, the holocaust is of a scale which calls for comparisons with Vietnam and with the Indonesian massacres of 1965-66.

Public figures here and abroad have condemned the West Pakistanis, many have demanded that they exercise restraint henceforth, and some that they should create conditions which would make it possible for the refugees to return. The World Bank team which visited East Pakistan in early June reported that the situation there would not return to normal "until there is a drastic reduction in the visibility and preferably even the presence" of the West Pakistan Army. But the case for an independent state of Bangla Desh has hardly been considered.

As I see it, there are seven major reasons why the cause of an independent Bangla Desh deserves support.

Of central importance is that continuing attempts to suppress the Bangla Desh movement are likely to be as futile as they are bloody. The men who lead this movement were shown to have overwhelming support in East Pakistan last December when the Awami League obtained 160 of the area's 162 seats in a free and fully contested election. And the attempt to break the back of the movement by what was hopefully intended as a short sharp crack-down has signally failed, with the Bengali units in the armed forces mutinying almost to a man. Since then Yajna Khan has repeatedly invited elected M.F.s of the banned Awami League to associate themselves with his regime by agreeing to take up their seats in the Pakistan parliament, but only 22 of the 160 have accepted his offer.

The reports of the few independent observers who have been allowed into East Bengal in the last three months agree that the military rulers of the area are continuing to find it necessary to act with the greatest harshness. In the words of Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times, who was in East Pakistan at the end of last month, "they are trying to make their occupation stick 'in spite of the region's crippled economy, the collapse of the Government administration, intensifying guerrilla activity by Bengali separatists, mounting Army casualties and an alienated sullen population". In these circumstances assurances by the Pakistani military authorities that they are seeking ways of making it possible for the refugees to return to East Bengal can only be regarded as either wishful thinking or window-dressing of the most hypocritical kind.

Secondly, the cause of an independent state in East Bengal makes good historical sense. The circumstances which led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947 -- essentially the widespread fear in the Muslim communities of British India that they would suffer discrimination and persecution in a Hindu-dominated independent India -- did not necessarily point to the establishment of a single Muslim state. The famous Lahore Resolution of 1940, in which the All-India Muslim League committed itself to the idea that the sub-continent should undergo partition, did not in fact call for a single state of Pakistan, demanding rather that the "North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States'". But the Muslim League's leaders, mainly Westerners, were able to use the intensity of anti-Hindu feeling which prevailed in East Bengal in the following years to win the adherence of some crucial Bengalis for the idea of a single Muslim state, and it was to this demand that Britain finally

acceded in 1947.

There were however vast contrasts in historical experience and cultural disposition between the two halves of the new country, the one half oriented to the Middle East, the other thoroughly Indic in basic culture and finding its inspiration as much in the Hindu Bengali poet Tagore as in the writings of the great Muslims. The power of Islam to create a sense of common identity between them waned quickly once Pakistan had actually come into being, and it was not long before many Eastern leaders realized that they had been led into a tragic mistake.

The dominance of Westerners in the newly formed Pakistan Army, combined with the shortage of senior administrators in East Bengal (this latter mainly a product of the partition-time emigration of Hindus) combined to make it possible for West Pakistanis to assume a role of political dominance in the Eastern province soon after independence, and this situation remained essentially unchanged until early 1971. Not only have central governments been dominated by Westerners since 1947, but the same has been true in large measure of the higher civil service in East Bengal -- and this despite the fact that there are 70 million people in the Eastern region and only 58 million in the Western.

One consequence has been a massive shift in the economic balance between the two halves. Foreign exchange from East Pakistan's raw materials exports, especially jute, has been used to buy capital goods and consumer items for the West, and the West has received almost 80% of Pakistan's overseas aid. Largely as a result of this, economic growth has been more rapid in West Pakistan, and East Bengal's sense of cultural distinctness and political subordination has been compounded by a sharp sense of economic grievance.

Thirdly, an independent Bangla Desh state would meet most tests of viability. It would certainly need international aid in generous quantities to repair the terrible devastation of the last three months. But in the long run it would be able to meet a large part of its import requirements from the foreign exchange earned by its jute and tea exports. It would benefit markedly from expansion of its trade with India, trade which would be on terms more favourable than those which have prevailed between East and West Pakistan. And it would draw considerable strength from its cultural homogeneity.

A fourth argument for an independent Bangla Desh is that in East Pakistan, unlike almost every other area claimed by a secessionist movement, a break could easily be "clean." Because the Eastern and Western parts of today's Pakistan are separated by more than 1000 miles, there would be no doubt about where the lines of a new partition would run. This is in sharp contrast to the situation posed by the breakaway movement of Biafra.

Fifthly, the success of secessionism in East Pakistan would not be internationally disruptive. It would indeed be the first major case in any of the new states which have emerged from colonial rule since World War II where a secessionist movement has succeeded in changing territorial boundaries. But the likelihood that this would activate currently dormant secessionism elsewhere is not great -- again in contrast with the case of Biafra. This is partly because political boundaries correspond better to ethnic and cultural configurations in Asia than in Africa. And it is also because the Bangla Desh movement is unique among would-be breakaway movements in newly independent states in speaking for an area which is situated far away from its metropolitan "mother country." It is indeed an anti-colonial movement in every major sense (except in not being directed against a European power).

Sixthly, the destabilizing consequences for India would be far smaller

than if Bangla Desh remains a guerrilla cause. of a sovereign Bangla Desh would certainly lead to hope that their province would one day merge greater Bengal state. But the great political and the important roles which millions of West economic, social and political life of other unlikely that West Bengali pressures for secession are very powerful.

The legacy of centuries of Hindu-Muslim the Dacca elite's long-established fears and Calcutta would further lessen the likelihood in this direction.

Conversely, the present situation in India. The refugees are not only a heavy resource, they are also a source of acute social locally and nationally. It is quite fanciful significant minority of them will return to the Pakistan Army is there. So long as India is inflamed by Pakistani oppression of Bengalis as special targets of persecution) it is most government will be able to concentrate on the its recent electoral victory was achieved.

Finally, West Pakistan itself would it has divested itself of the burden of the economic advantages which it has derived from This is not only because it would not have to sustained military operation against the Bang because it would be markedly easier to maintain state than in Pakistan as it has been constituted.

It is true that any settlement in which was conceded would leave Pakistan weakened and not threaten the rump state's survival, for which the strength of its armed forces. And Pakistan's weakening in its position vis a vis India at announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking would fall advantages in that relationship.

Let it be conceded immediately that would suffer from a settlement favourable to several hundred thousand Bengalis -- clerks, students -- who now live in West Pakistan would more severe pressure than they have recently would be the fate of the non-Bengalis in East several hundred thousand Punjabis, Sindhis and from the Western half as administrators and and more importantly, two million or so Bihar refugees from various parts of India, who have of West Pakistani oppression in the last three fear for the fate of the Bengalis who have many other material benefits as a result of the many others since the end of March.

But what is the alternative? It is of Vietnam, an ultimately impossible attempt to compromise himself by association with the five or ten years of terrorism from above and fishing in troubled waters, before the attempt less violence is surely avoidable if the outside

than if Bangla Desh remains a guerilla cause. The successful establishment of a sovereign Bangla Desh would certainly lead some groups of West Bengalis to hope that their province would one day merge with Bangla Desh to form a greater Bengal state. But the great political heterogeneity of West Bengal and the important roles which millions of West Bengalis play in the economic, social and political life of other provinces of India make it unlikely that West Bengali pressures for secession from India would ever be very powerful.

The legacy of centuries of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the area and the Dacca elite's long-established fears and suspicions of the elite of Calcutta would further lessen the likelihood of serious moves being made in this direction.

Conversely, the present situation is a major threat to the stability of India. The refugees are not only a heavy burden on India's economic resources, they are also a source of acute social and political tensions, locally and nationally. It is quite fanciful to suggest that even a significant minority of them will return to their East Bengal homes while the Pakistan Army is there. So long as Indian nationalist passions are inflamed by Pakistani oppression of Bengalis (and the singling out of Hindus as special targets of persecution) it is most unlikely that Mrs. Gandhi's government will be able to concentrate on the domestic programs for which its recent electoral victory was achieved.

Finally, West Pakistan itself would certainly be better off once it has divested itself of the burden of the rebellious East -- despite the economic advantages which it has derived from its overlordship there. This is not only because it would not have to bear the costs of a long-sustained military operation against the Bangla Desh nationalists but also because it would be markedly easier to maintain stability in the new rump state than in Pakistan as it has been constituted to date.

It is true that any settlement in which Bangla Desh independence was conceded would leave Pakistan weakened vis a vis India. But this would not threaten the rump state's survival, for which it could safely rely on the strength of its armed forces. And Pakistan can surely afford some weakening in its position vis a vis India at the present time. The announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking has after all given it windfall advantages in that relationship.

Let it be conceded immediately that many groups and communities would suffer from a settlement favourable to the Bangla Desh cause. The several hundred thousand Bengalis -- clerks, petty traders, teachers and students -- who now live in West Pakistan would probably come under even more severe pressure than they have recently experienced. Probably worse would be the fate of the non-Bengalis in East Pakistan, not only the several hundred thousand Punjabis, Sindhis and Pathans, who have come in from the Western half as administrators and white collar workers, but also, and more importantly, two million or so Biharis and others, Muslim refugees from various parts of India, who have been the hated catspaws of West Pakistani oppression in the last three months. Finally one would fear for the fate of the Bengalis who have managed to obtain land and other material benefits as a result of the mass expulsion of Hindus and others since the end of March.

But what is the alternative? It is surely a fate akin to that of Vietnam, an ultimately impossible attempt to maintain rule by naked violence in a country where hardly one political leader of stature will compromise himself by association with the governing power. Will it take five or ten years of terrorism from above and below, with great powers fishing in troubled waters, before the attempt is abandoned? Such sense-

Yahya hard now.

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Let it be clear that Yahya Khan's is not a government composed principally of vicious men or psychopaths. It consists rather of men of limited vision (and little feel for Bengali outlooks and aspirations) who were placed before a near impossible dilemma. What Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League demanded of Yahya and his associates in the negotiations which followed their landslide victory in last December's elections was not the independence of East Bengal, but it was something close to it. In particular, Mujibur's demand for regional autonomy carried far-reaching economic implications, and his demand that security in the Eastern half of the country should be in the hands of an East Pakistan militia, was one which no Western government could accept without a severe loss of authority.

As Yahya saw it, a military crackdown was the only alternative. He knew well enough that this was a gamble. But as an all-Pakistan patriot, and as the head of an army whose principal rationale is defence against India, he believed he had to try.

Now his gamble has demonstrably failed. And its failure has left him in a quagmire with no light on the horizon.

Under these circumstances international pressure could well be effective in forcing the Yahya government to a complete withdrawal from the East. With the East Bengal economy in ruins, and huge resources required for the military campaign, the Islamabad government is in desperate need of economic support from the outside world. If such support is consistently refused Islamabad may well agree to abandon the Eastern area.

Islamabad's initial responses to Western pressure of this kind are likely to be extremely hostile, involving more threats of Pakistan's moving into closer alliance with China. But the aid which China can give, over and above what it is currently providing, is very limited. As for concern lest Western humiliation of the Yahya government should expand the Chinese sphere of influence, it is surely likely that Peking would draw greater benefit from a long war between the West Pakistan government and the Bangla Dash guerrillas, inasmuch as this could lead to the Bangla Dash cause coming under Maoist leadership.

The Islamabad government could be made to cut its losses, possibly quite soon, if the pressure of world opinion is persistent and if it is radically skeptical of Yahya's window-dressing arrangements.

West Pakistani leaders have known for a long time that their rule is hated in the East. The idea that it might be sensible to allow the unappreciative Bengalis to go their own way is by no means a new one.

And there are of course precedents. The Dutch gave up their control of Indonesia in 1949 in roughly similar circumstances. In December 1948 they had made a desperate attempt to strike a knockout blow against the Indonesian Republic. By the following March it was clear that they had failed to break the Indonesian nationalists' spirit and the U.N. then insisted that they disengage completely rather than fight a long war against determined guerrillas. Ten years later France withdrew from Algeria when it became clear that its military might would never prevail against Algerian nationalism. It did so despite the fact that a million of its citizens lived there and despite the long-proclaimed contention that Algeria was part of France. And it is not difficult to see analogies with the way in which the U.S. is being forced to swallow its pride in Indo-China today.

International pressure could be effective in moving the Yahya Khan

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government, particularly if it is pressure from the Eastern area. But let it be stressed for outside powers to advise the West Pakistan towards the restoration of democracy and civil that may well lead simply to more window-dressing.

The hard fact is that, for a government as tenuous as that of Islamabad in post-Marc alternatives are more of the massive repression and complete disengagement.

Herbert Feith
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23 July 1971

government, particularly if it is pressure for the actual relinquishment of the Eastern area. But let it be stressed that it is not enough for outside powers to advise the West Pakistan authorities to move towards the restoration of democracy and civilian government in the East. That may well lead simply to more window-dressing there.

The hard fact is that, for a government whose hold on power is as tenuous as that of Islamabad in post-March 1971 East Bengal, the only alternatives are more of the massive repression being perpetrated today and complete disengagement.

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